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ABSTRACT
A clinical investigation was conducted in the Studies and Require-
ments Division, Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico, Virginia
to assess the potential va^lue of an educational program that had been
proposed previously as a solution to the problems of the Division. The
analysis proceeded along four dimensions: (1) a personal human dimen-
sion, (2) a formal organizational dimension, (3) a social system dimen-
sion and (4) a technological dimension.
A leading theorist's work was utilized in each analysis as a guide
in identifying the variables that functioned in the Division to prevent it
from attaining a desired degree of effectiveness. The proposed educa-
tional program was then related to the problems found in order to assess
its potential value.
It was found that the problems stem from the relations among ele-
ments of the total situation. A balanced solution is proposed which in-
corporates the educational program as a necessary sub-set of a larger
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How does one transfer the effort, the potential, the hopes and the
dreams of organizational^ design into reality? How does one secure
from people work contributions of a unique nature for which few or no
precedents exist and for which the individuals involved are largely-
unprepared? How does one turn operators into planners?
The Studies and Requirements Division of the Marine Corps Develop-
ment Center, Quantico, Virginia was established in April of 1969. That
organization's purpose requires combining several diverse disciplines
of knowledge with field experience into an integrated research and
development effort for future Marine Corps operations. The task of
managing and executing studies in time frames of up to twenty years
into the future is no easy one. It could be facilitated by diverting large
outflows of funds to create a heavily civilian staffed organization of the
now popular "think-tank" variety. The economics of today's military
appropriations precludes such an approach.
The leaders of this activity are left with the assets at hand. These
assets mostly consist of some seventy Marine Corps officers in the
ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Major. How do they reorient these
individuals to work in a foreign field, and do it quickly, effectively,
efficiently and without destroying their motivation?

B. A DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANIZATION
In this first section we will describe the work of the Studies and
Requirements Division (S&R), the Marine Corps Research and Develop-
ment Community in general, and the organization, functions and respon-
sibilities of S&R in particular.
1. The Work
The main product of the Studies and Requirements Division is
Marine Corps Studies. The division itself defines a study as follows:
A study is a critical examination or investigation of a
subject which: (1) analyzes the projected capabilities
of alternative Marine Corps force levels and systems
as these relate to current and or projected military
roles and missions in support of national policies and
objectives, (2) utilizes the techniques of operations
research and systems analysis, (3) produces a docu-
ment embodying the results of the examination in
quantitative terms, and (4) provides the Commandant
of the Marine Corps (CMC) with an analytical rationale
by which he may select the most efficient and effective
means of accomplishing the mission of the Marine Corps. 1
The categories of studies include: manpower and personnel,
concepts and plans, operations and force structures, logistics, science
and technology, and management. As mentioned above these studies are
accomplished by conceiving the various categories and interrelations
for time periods of up to twenty years into the future.
2. Project Officers
Prior to the inception of the Studies and Requirements Division
the Marine Corps R&D effort had mainly been limited to the testing and
Studies and RequirementsDivision, Research Development and
Studies Handbook, produced internally at S&R, April, 1971, p. 1-1.
Cited hereafter as RD&S Handbook.
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evaluation of equipment already developed. This was due to many-
factors, among which were: the relatively small size of the Corps,
scarcity of funds, and the overlap of Army and Marine Corps functions.
This hardware oriented approach was basically a passive one. The
Marine Corps was a buyer, not a developer.
The 1969 reorganization of the Marine Corps Development
Center at Quantico recreated missions and functions that had been in
abeyance for many years. Quantico had once been the center of concept
development for such tactics and techniques as; amphibious operations,
close air support and the vertical envelopment. This work had been
2
abandoned in the 1950's.
Obviously the planning of organization, doctrine, tactics and
techniques for periods of up through the long range (20 years) calls for
a number of unique abilities on the part of those who are called upon to
do it. At S&R these individuals are entitled "project officers". It is
the contributions of the project officers that have raised for us the prob-
lems that have been noted at the division. This is not to say that they
are in anyway remiss. For the most part, they enter the division with
no special educational qualifications. Yet, the work is of such complexity
that special education appears to be required.
In the project officer we find our basic unit of analysis. Some
typical questions addressed by project officers are:
2See U. S. Marine Corps, A Study of the Marine Corps R&D Program ,
Vol. II, produced by Management Technology, Inc. , July 1967.

a. Should the Marine Corps buy a Light Observation
Helicopter?
b. Is a drone needed? What missions? Tradeoffs?
c. How much air mobility is required in the midrange
period? (Midrange describes periods of up to ten
years into the future. )
d. What is a reasonable air defense capability for the
midrange?
e. When should each proposed new weapon system be
introduced for maximum force effectiveness?
f. How far can the Seaborne Mobile Logistics System
be implemented in the midrange period? What
impact will it have on operations?
g. How can midrange objectives be effectively dove-
tailed with long range goals?
h. What are the most likely missions and tasks for the
Marine Corps in the midrange period? The long-
range?
In more general terms the project officer is attempting to
accomplish the following tasks:
i. Clarify and select long-range concepts and mid-
range objectives.
j. Identify capabilities and deficiencies in systems.
k. Determine options in systems acquisitions and
system changes to meet roles and missions.
1. Establish priorities of major projects.
m. Determine constraints and risks.
n. Force Plan
The project officer must integrate his previous military
experience in the form of judgment with a total systems approach to a
10

specific area that will lead to optimum level options of balanced forces
in order that the Marine Corps will be able to meet its assigned roles
in the future. In a single sentence, our project officers are attempting
to provide the Corps with a data bank for decision making.
3. An Example of the Problem.
An example of the problem experienced by the executives of
the S&R Division as it relates to the project officer might be helpful
here for gaining a clearer understanding of it.
A midrange project officer is given the task of reviewing
artillery requirements in low-intensity conflict ten years from now.
At first he identifies all the possible and probable requirements of
artillery as projected in various planning documents already in exist-
ence. After a multitude of man-hours, he concludes that there is a
need for a light artillery capability for firing effectively for up to
ranges of fifty miles. He reviews the current investigations of Army
analysts and Department of Defense contractors and identifies various
options in the hardware field. He may further initiate a trade off
analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis to determine a recommended
set of systems on a priority basis.
Such a study may take months of difficult, time-consuming
work. The point is that this project officer has not considered the
entire range of possibilities. He has not linked up all the assets in
the future Marine Corps inventory and applied them to his analysis.
He has concentrated on solving the problem from the field of fire
il

support only. While this is a simple example, and is used to make a
point only, we can see that the range could be attained from a series
of schemes. The mobility of the system could have been analyzed.
Helicopters or ground transportation could be utilized to displace the
artillery system rapidly to new positions where the same objective
could be realized.
The expertise needed for a project should now be coming into
focus. Aside from his military specialty the project officer needs an
understanding of systems engineering and analysis. He comes into
immediate contact with Department of Defense contractors and, there-
fore, an understanding of American industrial organization and con-
tract administration would be useful. Cost effectiveness and trade-off
analysis are functions that he must assume. The requirement of
generating various options and mixes calls for at least a basic under-
standing of operations research. Finally, a way of thinking that
transcends the boundaries of all disciplines and integrates them into
a whole is required.
The executives of S&R have made it clear that they do not
expect their officers to become experts in all these fields. Specialists
are available at the Development Center who can provide the knowledge
needed. However, they must be able to communicate with these spe-
cialists on a variety of problems concerning their work, and therefore
need some understanding of the disciplines.
12

Another problem area evolves from the fact that over the
years the Marine Corps has developed a unique body of operators of
which our project officers are representative. These are men who
can tackle a problem with the assets at hand and push through to the
desired conclusion. This operating orientation has been instilled in
Marines in the form of leadership and command. At the Studies and
Requirements Division, the methods used by the commander have to
be set aside in favor of those used by the planner or researcher. This
is the transition that must be accomplished to solve the problems of
the division.
4. The Organization
Let us start here with a short description of the Marine Corps
R&D Organization external to the Studies and Requirements Division
and then concentrate on S&R exclusively. We shall rely on a number
of sources for this section. They are: The Marine Corps Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation Manual, (NAVMC 2635) of 2 Decem-
ber 1970); the Marine Corps' Development Center's Standing Operating
Procedure of April 1971; plus the already cited RD&S Handbook and
the Management Technology Study. We do not intend to cover this
organization in depth, but only desire to leave the uninformed reader
with a picture of the general place in which the S&R Division sets in




(1) Statutory Authority . The National Security Act of
1947 sets forth the following assignment of functions for the Corps
which are directly related to R&D:
(a) To develop in coordination with the U. S. Army
and U. S. Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations pertaining
to the tactics, techniques and equipment used by landing forces.
(b) To be responsible, in accordance with integrated
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of
the Marine Corps so as to meet the needs of war.
As do many of the laws of Congress, the National
Security Act is left to a" great deal of interpretation. We can see that
the Marine Corps has direct Research and Development responsibility
for only the amphibious (landing force) aspects thereof. But, where
do these aspects start, where do they end? These are but two of the
implications that had to be considered in the constructing of a Marine
R&D effort. There are presently two major organizations in the Corps
primarily concerned with R&D. They are: Headquarters Marine Corps
(HQMC), and the Marine Corps Development and Education Command
(MCDEC).
(2) Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). Unlike the
Army and Air Force, there is no major R&D command per se in the
Marine Corps. All R&D activities are centralized in and controlled
from HQMC. Within HQMC the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
(DC/S) Research Development and Studies (RD&S) is the only staff
element whose primary mission is directly related to accomplishing the
14

Corps' R&D Program. Certain R&D responsibilities and functions are
explicitly assigned other staff elements and organizations, however, the
DC/S for RD&S is the primary HQMC section with which the S&R Divi-
sion deals.
In carrying out his mission of assisting the Chief of
Staff of the Marine Corps, in the various staff functions dealing with
R&D, the DC/S (RD&S) integrates and directs the Headquarters staff,
the Marine Corps Development Center (of which S&R is one of seven
divisions) and other field activities in these areas. Specifically, the
office is tasked with the following functions:
(a) Formulate policies for the total Marine Corps
aviation and ground R&D and studies programs.
(b) Prepare and execute Corps portions of the
Department of the Navy R&D budget and programs.
(c) Provide scientific assistance, operations research,
cost effectiveness and systems analysis support to
HQMC staff.
The office of the DC/S (RD&S) is organized as shown
in figure 1-1, page 16.
The following sub-units of the office perform the
following functions:
"a. Scientific Advisor: Serves as the principal con-
sultant and advisor to DC/S (RD&S) and to other general and special
staff divisions for scientific matters and with respect to studies and
analysis. His primary purpose is to provide scientific and analytic
judgment, guidance and recommendations to insure the effectiveness









































b. Plans and Programs Branch . As a whole, coor-
dinates the staff actions required to prepare the RTD&E program and
budget, and to document, substantiate and execute the latter two. The
Plans Section has specific cognizance over the staffing and preparation
of the Section XI (R&D) to the Marine Medium Range Objectives Plan,
Marine Corps requirements documents, Marine Corps comments on
inputs to the other Services' requirements documents and Marine Corps
participation in R&D requirements briefings presented to the scientific,
technological and industrial communities. The Programs section super-
vises all actions require^! to formulate and execute the Marine Corps
R&D program.
c. Studies Branch. Coordinates all major Marine
Corps studies and monitors the studies of the other services, govern-
ment agencies and the services of friendly nations which have implica-
tions for or are of interest to the Marine Corps. This branch coordinates
the HQMC staff in the development of a five year studies program and in
the formulation and functioning of advisory committees for each study
which is undertaken. . . . ;
d. Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG).
The MCOAG conducts operations research, systems analyses and cost
effectiveness studies for the Marine Corps A detachment of the
MCOAG is located at Quanticc, Virginia to support the Marine Corps
Development Center with operations research assistance both in conduct-
ing studies and in evaluation of new weapons, equipment and tactics.
MCOAG field representatives provide operations analysis assistance to
the Fleet Marine Forces in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. "
We can already see from the above, that the Office of
the DC/S (RD&S) at HQMC has an extremely close association with the
work of the S&R Division. It is also important to note that this office
has the control over a much larger portion of the Marine Corps budget
4
allowance for R&D than does the entire Development Center at Quantico.
The many other elements of HQMC become involved with the S&R
3u. S. Marine Corps; Research Development, Test and Evaluation
Manual (NAVMC 2635), 2 December 1970, pp. 6-1 & 6-2.
From an orientation briefing held at the Development Center for
incoming personnel in April 1971.
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Division through the sponsoring of studies. For any single study, the
staff agency that sponsors it from HQMC appears to be the influential
external agency outside the division itself. This influence is manifested
in the person of a HQMC project officer from the sponsoring staff section.
(3) Marine Corps Development and Education Command
(MCDEC). MCDEC comprises three elements: The Marine Corps Base
at Quantico, the Marine Corps Education Center, and the Marine Corps
Development Center. The Development Center is the organizational
element manned for R&D functions. The Deputy for Development to the
Commanding General, MCDEC is the Director of the Development Center
which is the area of our interest and to which we now turn.
(4) Marine Corps Development Center. As mentioned
above, the organization and manning of the Development Center tended
to reflect a hardware orientation. The birth of the Studies and Require-
ments Division in April 1969 was an effort to expand the capabilities of
the Center for developing concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques and
organizational structures, in order that they be in balance with the
equipment evaluation capability.
The mission of the Center is to:
1. To perform research, development, test and
evaluation functions, including war gaming, in order to:
a. Develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and
equipment for employment of Marine Corps
forces.
b. Develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and




c. Support Marine Corps requirements for
long-range planning by identifying required
study areas and by initiating and conducting
study of such areas in coordination with other
governmental and civilian contract study
agencies, as appropriate, on a priority which
generally weighs long-range importance ahead
of short-range urgency. "->
The Center is organized into a Headquarters and
seven Divisions as shown in Figure 1-2, page 20. All the Divisions
are hardware oriented with the exception of the Operations and Ser-
vices Division which is analogous to a headquarters section; the
Organization, Doctrine, Tactics and Techniques Division; and the
subject of our investigation, the Studies and Requirements Division.
The Organization, Doctrine, Tactics and Techniques Division utilizes
after-actioii reports and other information sources to update Marine
Corps publications in these areas. The Hardware Divisions are gen-
erally involved in the testing and evaluation of equipment. The impor-
tant result that came out of the investigation was that each Division
was fundamentally introverted from the perspective of the S&R Project
Officers. Their dealings with the personnel of the other Divisions was
extremely limited. Many expressed complete ignorance as to the
operations and/or product of many of the other Divisions. We shall
now move on to the internal organization of the S&rR Division.
^Marine Corps Development Center, Standing Operating Procedure
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b. Internal Organization of the S&R Division.
Prior to delineating the functional structure of the Division,
let us inspect the Marine concept of the R&D process. The total process
is oriented toward a long range concept which is a projection of world
conditions as they are expected to be 25 years in the future. This pro-
jection constitutes the Marine Long Range Study. From this study a
long range plan is produced which depicts the desired Marine Corps
posture up through that time. These are the base documents for the
entire R&D effort, theoretically. The midrange cycle refers to a time
period of up to ten years in the future. The planning documents ad-
dressing this period act as a bridge between what is and what the long
range documents propose. In other words, there should be an orderly
progression toward long range goals through the auspices of a mid-
range planning paper. Because of the time element involved these
efforts are primarily directed at materials and techniques whose
feasibility is already known. It is in this midrange area that the
greatest emphasis in men, time and money is given at S&R.
The organizational chart depicting the S&R Division is
shown as Figure 1-3, on page 22 . The following extract of the already
cited RD&S Handbook describes the official functions of the Division.
We shall be comparing these elements with the results of the investiga-
tion in later chapters.
Functions: Within the five functional areas of combat,
(Mobility; Fire Support; Intelligence; Logistics; and
Command, Control and Communications). The S&R






































Vj v-» «— >-» ?r 61 It- m M *- C >-
*






means of baseline (derivative) studies that address long-
range concept formulation, mid-range operational objec-
tives, and determination of requirements documents. The
Divison also supplies war gaming support to the derivative
study program, which represents both Navy and Marine
Corps needs.
Tasks. The S&R Division is tasked as follows:
a. Consonant with national strategy for the use of military
force, to formulate advanced concepts for the long range period in all
functional areas
b. To develop mid-range operational objectives in all
functional areas by means of derivative and supporting sttxdies.
c. To identify force structure and system capabilities
and deficiencies
d. To provide operational analysis in force planning
e. To provide objective methodology for the war gaming
of landing force operations and to conduct war games in support of
derivative studies as required
f. To prepare and coordinate requirements documentation
to be used as primary guidance in the acquisition of equipment
as follows:
Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the branches are
a. Headquarters and Administrative Section.
(1) To provide support to the Chief, S&R Division
in the direction, supervision, and operation of all the Branches ....
b. Long Range Branch.
(1) To project likely requirements for Marine Corps
forces for the long range period through study of trends in the global
political environment, and analysis of likely avenues of future techno-
logical achievments.
(2) To refine and extend long range concepts and,
as appropriate, to develop new concepts through derivative studies
23

(3) To conduct the periodic update of . . . the Marine
Long Range Study
c. Mid-Range Branch
(1) To determine R&D planning objectives to meet
established roles and missions for the landing force during the mid- range
period. To maintain mid-range objectives in correspondence or con-
vergence with long range objectives.
(2) To conduct derivative studies in all functional
areas
(3) To conduct special studies reflective of all func-
tional areas, as required to meet short-range (0-5 years) force planning.
(4) To provide operational analysis in force planning
to meet the needs of the landing force, primarily in the low and mid-
intensity conflict environments.
d. Requirements and Coordination Branch
(1) To effect overall management of Marine Corps
requirements documentation
(2) To effect continuous review of other Services'
requirement documents and publications, and to recommend adoption
or substitution as appropriate
(3) To effect continuous review and cognizance for
the R&D Planning Objectives Section (PART XII) of MMROP; and to
recommend changes thereto
(4) To effect continuous review and cognizance for
the Marine Corps requirements publication "SEARCH", to correlate
it with MMROP (Marine Mid -Range Objectives Plan)
e. War Games Branch
(1) To develop an objective methodology for continuous
use in the war gaming of landing force operations.
(2) To maintain a capability to conduct a major
developmental game, and concurrently to maintain a capability to
evaluate a contingency plan without disrupting the level of effort
applied to either task.





The investigation with which this thesis is concerned was
instigated at the behest of the present Chief of the S&R Division,
Colonel William P. Mitchell, who first perceived the problem as des-
cribed in the opening of the chapter. The investigator spent three weeks
at S&tR during which time he interviewed numerous officers both in and
out of the Division and observed its operations.
2. Methodology
This is an investigation of a clinical nature. By this, we mean
that the client organization (S&R) was visited and initially observed as a
total entity. Following this, an attempt was made to diagnose the origins
of the problem experienced by analytically interpreting certain sub-
systems of process in the Division that appeared to contain elements of
the problem. The data needed was generated by means of in-depth
interviews With one -fourth of the seventy officers assigned to the
Division. No statistical surveys were made before, during, or after
the investigation. No member of the Division is referred to personally,
with the exception of the Chief, Colonel Mitchell; therefore, the reader
must rely on the integrity of the writer for the validity of his information.
Whole ranges of opinions, attitudes and answers were displayed
at S&R. However, certain trends became discernible after a short
period. These trends became the basis for further research and




Initially it was believed by the Chief of the Division and a group of
professors at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, with whom
the Chief had consulted, that an education program designed to enhance
the technical proficiency of the project officers might suffice to solve
the problem. The program was envisioned as a short course of approx-
imately five weeks duration that would be presented by professional
university level teachers a few hours a day at the Division. The course
was to be organized around the following disciplines:
1. Organizational Theory and Practice.
2. Systems Analysis /Systems Engineering.
3. Managerial Accounting.
4. Industrial Organization/Procurement &; Contract Administration.
5. Operations Analysis.
This investigation was undertaken to discover if the proposed solution
would be beneficial in solving the problem at S&R.
Our choice then was to either remain isolated in the area of these
technical or procedural disciplines or to cover the entire range of
problems that face organizations in general. We chose the latter course.
But in order even to commence a frame of reference or model of some
sort was needed. Let us turn to that model now.
E. THE MODEL
The four main chapters of this thesis exploit the concept of multi-
dimensionality in human behavior. Here, this term means conceiving
human behavior as a totality, responsive as a system of behavior to
26

four dimensions of process meaningful in four frames of reference.
The dimensions and their associated frames of reference are:
1. The personal dimension, in which the individual conceives
himself.
2. A technological dimension, in which he conceives the nature
of systematic knowledge.
3. An organizational dimension, in which he conceives task and
purpose.
4. A social dimension, in which he conceives his relations with
others.
The ordering of these dimensions is not significant, they coexist
simultaneously.
A model diagram depicting this system is represented by Figure
1-4. The key to utilizing this multi-dimensional way of thinking lies
in accumulating enough experience to develop a conscious realization
of the mutual dependence of these dim^^sions of human behavior. For
example, what benefits would follow from an educational program of a
technical nature for project officers if they did not accept the purpose
of the organization to begin with (e. g. , the technological dimension
in relation to the organizational dimension)?
F. THE THESIS
During and after the investigation, behavior in the Division was
viewed consciously along each dimension as described in the model.
In the body of this paper we relate what was found to the work of a
The model on page 28 and the way of thinking that it represents
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major theorist, again along each dimension. The work of the theorists
allows us to identify various intervening variables that partially, or
fully, blocked the Division from fulfilling the expectations of the Chief
of the Division. This analysis is carried out in four separate chapters.
In the final chapter we examine the interrelationships of the
variables in conjunction with the benefits the described educational
program could offer. The conclusion offered is that to concentrate on
one dimension, which was the basis of the original proposed solution,
would not be enough. In a single sentence our thesis is:
That the problems of the Division arise less from deficiencies
along any one dimension of organizational process than from
the difficulties arising from the rrmtual dependence of all
dimensions in fulfilling the organization's purpose.
If by the time the reader finishes the last page of this introduction
and understands the applicability of its words to the Studies and Require-
ments Division, Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico, Virginia,
then we feel we will have succeeded in establishing the problem under
study. In the next five chapters we will disclose the evidence gathered
to support this argument presented as the conclusion of this thesis.
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II. THE PERSONAL DIMENSION
A. THE PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to view the Studies and Require-
ments Division from the perspective of the project officer at a personal
level. How does it feel to be a project officer at Studies and Require-
ments? How do project officers perceive themselves? From what do
they gain satisfaction?
The human dimension has been thrust into the forefront of organiza-
tional analysis in recent years. Historically it had been vastly over-
shadowed by the concerns of science and technology in a rapidly
changing world. The field today in A.merica 's corporate strnrhire, as
well as to a lesser extent, the military community, is receiving a
great deal of attention. A human potential movement is gaining strength
as it emanates from such centers as the National Training Laboratory
at Bethel, Maine and the Esalen Institute at Big Sur, California. The
great majority of the "Fortune- 300" have experimented with various
approaches to what is often called human relations. Such terms as
group dynamics, T- Groups, Encounter Groups and Sensitivity Training
have become common not only at the personnel departments of these
institutions but also at the highest levels of executive functioning.
The purpose of all these activities is to reinstate the preeminence
of "man" in all human endeavor, including work. The average American
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spends forty hours per week at work. By adding in lunch, commutation,
getting ready for the job, keying down after it, etc.
,
we can see that his
life is to a great extent a function of his work. Should the organization,
the machine profits, or even victory be entities or goals that cause the
sacrifice of human dignity? Can these entities and goals be enhanced
if human worth is put to the forefront? These are the questions that
behavioral scientists and human relations aspirants are studying today
in ever increasing numbers.
In this chapter, we will devote these initial pages to the delineating
of one of the more prominent theorists major contributions to the field
of the personal dimension. We shall then attempt to correlate his find-
ings with the findings of this investigation as they pertain to the personal
situation of the project officer. Our objective will be to illuminate the
intervening variables which beset the situation at the Studies and Require-
ments Division thus preventing the project officer from attaining the
peak performance indicated in the ideal of the theorist. We shall sup-
port the primary theorist with the writings of others in the field of
human relations at specified points.
A word of caution is necessary at this early stage in the develop-
ment of our thesis. We have already stated that it is our belief that
the problems of the division and, in fact, many organizations in and
out of government, stem from the fact that a balanced approach to the
multi-dimensional nature of human behavior is not taken. In this
chapter, as in the next three, we are viewing problems from one
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dimension only. Situations will be diagnosed more than once, however,
the dimension, or frame of reference will be different in each case.
It may be difficult for the reader to accept this approach. Our problem
is that we have a great deal to say, but cannot say it all until we've
constructed our entire framework.
The onus here is on the reader. He must bear with us to the
bitter end if he expects this work to bear fruit. To skip to the end and
expect to understand what is said there without fully understanding the
foregoing would be analogous to a builder constructing the roof before
the frame. It can be done, but the end result looks a bit silly. At the
same time, a grave danger lies in reading any one of the four main
chapters without reading the others. If this is done it will seem that
a solution to a multi-dimensional problem may be obtained through
working with one dimension to the exclusion of the others. This will
6
lead to what Fritz J. Roethlisberger has called "cultism. "
Cultism is an especially nasty business in the area of human
relations. It has been offered as the answer to why many well meaning
7human relations experiments have met with unmittigating failure.
°F. J. Roethlisberger, Training for Human Relations , (Boston:
Harvard University, 1954), See Chapter VIII "Learning in a Multi-
dimensional World", pp. 115-142.
^See Hand and Slocum, Human Relations Training for Middle




Cultism occurs when one consideration in a set of rnulti-dimensional
considerations is held up to the disregard and detriment of considera-
tions in the other dimensional areas. One can imagine the employer
stating; "To hell with profits, as long as my employees are happy. "
This would be fine if the employer had inexhaustible reserves to keep
from going bankrupt, but unfortunately we seldom see that situation.
Life is a complex process just as man is a complex animal. The multi-
dimensional approach to the problems at Studies and Requirements
Division is not the easiest way to analyze its difficulties, but it is the
underlying assumption of this thesis that such is the best way to solve
them.
B. ABRAHAM MASLOW: THE HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
The principal theorist to which we shall turn for assistance in
aiding our effort along the personal dimension is Abraham Maslow, a
late Professor of Psychology at Brandeis University. A list of his
contributions and the works of certain other writers in the human
relations field which support this portion of the paper follows:
Theorist Major Works
Abraham Maslow: Motivation and Personality (New York:
Harper & Row, 1951).
Eupsychian Management (Homewood, 111:
R. D. Irwin, 1965).
Chris Argyis: Personality and Organization (New York:
Harper & Row, 1954).
Integrating the Individual and the





Philip Selznik: Leadership in Administration, (Evanston:
Row Peterson & Co. , 1957).
Douglas McGregor: The Human Side of the Enterprise, (New
York: McGraw-Hill~Book Co. I960)
.
Rensis Likert: New Patterns of Management, (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961).
"The only happy people I know are the ones who are working well
Q
at something they consider important. " We should keep in mind the
terms, "Working well", and "important" throughout this discourse.
Let us as simply as possible consider some points of Dr. Maslow's
theories, especially as they concern what he has entitled, the "hierarchy
of needs" in his work.
All behavior is motivated with the exception of reflexes. By
motivated, we mean that an act is worthwhile and by that we mean that
the results of the act reduce some kind of need that the actor possesses.
What are these needs? Professor Maslow has identified five of them.






^Abraham H. Maslow, Eupsychian Management, (Homewood,
Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965). p. 6.
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The physiological needs are basically survival needs; they have a
biochemical basis in the organism. If these needs are not satisfied
the organism dies. Specifically these needs are the needs for water,
food, oxygen, sleep; the need to maintain a certain chemical balance
with the environment.
The safety needs have no physical basis but are very pressing.
As the term suggests, what we have here is the need for physical
safety and security. And, to the extent that economic security is
relevant, we can include that also. A non-hazardous work place and
the need to have a feeling of security against an uncertain job future
also would come under safety needs.
Social needs may be identified as love needs or affiliative needs.
This is the need to belong, the need to be a member of some group.
After all, man is a finite organism living in an infinite universe. He
needs something to transcend his own solitude and he achieves this by
joining groups, entering into social relationships with other people.
Esteem needs, or ego needs, are related to the term self or
self-concept. If you wish, one can think of the self as being a very
large bundle of assertions and propositions which a person holds true
about himself. Most people gain esteem from the manner in which
other people hold them in view. For instance, one could say, "I am
a competent project officer. " To be able to say this infers that the
individual has a certain degree of self esteem which has been re-
inforced by the esteem granted him by others.
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Literally, of course, there must be hundreds of thousands of
these propositions linked together in a complex matrix of some sort
which forms the self concept of the individual.
Human behavior, says Professor Maslow, can be viewed as an
attempt on a person's part to elicit from his experiences with the
world around him evidence, feedback, data, which will verify his self
concept. The esteem gained by the verification of his self concept is
a function of that experience. In other words, if one's self-concept is
low, the need will be low to verify his self concept at a higher level
and therefore the actions to fulfill that need will be minimal. If, for
example, a project officer believes he is incompetent, his work will
probably be unsatisfactory, because the effort he puts into it will be
relatively low, i. e.
,
the need to prove that he is competent is weak.
This thought is an important one. It is the basis for one of the main
ideas that Douglas McGregor put forth in his classic work, The Human
Side of the Enterprise.
At the top of the hierarchy of needs we find the self actualization
needs. Self actualization is an extremely difficult concept to explain.
We can say that this need develops out of the esteem needs. It is a
need to become more of what one experiences himself as capable of
becoming. That is, to realize one's potentialities to the utmost - to
grow, to develop, to improve one's human self.
36

C. THE MEANING OF THE HIERARCHY
Maslow asserts that all men have the described needs at divergent
stages of development. The strength of one need is a function of how
well satisfied other simultaneously existing needs are. More fundamen-
tally, the need at any one level will not become salient and dominant
until the needs at all subordinate levels are reasonably satisfied. In
other words, we do not find people attempting to self actualize while
they are starving to death.
This means that while all men are capable of displaying these needs,
they do not all display them in equal intensity at any given time. This
is important to note especially for top management who often confuse
their own needs with the needs of subordinates. If they attempt to
satisfy their subordinates with rewards that they themselves desire,
very often an incongruence of behavior will result.
D. ANALYSIS
1. Purpose
In this section, let us begin to correlate the set of human
needs as described by our theorist - Maslow - with what the investiga
tion uncovered at the Studies and Requirements Division. Here, we
will analyze three sub-areas that are meant neither to be collectively
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, but will allow us a limitation on
this endeavour. The areas are:
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a. Selection of Personnel and Assignment of Work.
b. The Work Itself.
c. The Professional Climate.
Let us review our purpose here. We are in the personal
dimension. Our basic unit of investigation is the Project Officer of
the Studies and Requirements Division. We want to try to understand
what the above areas mean to him and thus how these areas affect his
work. We shall do this by seeing how these areas affect the need
hierarchy of the "average project officer".
2. Selection of Personnel and Work Assignment
a. External Assignment
All Marine Officers at S&R are assigned to the division
by the Headquarters at the Development Center. In turn, they are
assigned to the Center by the Headquarters, Marine Corps Development
and Education Command, and were, in turn, assigned to that Command
by their ultimate assignors, their career monitors at Headquarters
Marine Corps. This is the same, basic, decentralized method of
assignment utilized throughout the Marine Corps.
A few exceptions to this rule are found in twenty-four
billets at the Development Center requiring some form of advanced
education beyond the baccalaureate level. These billets are designated
as Special Education Program (SEP) billets. Four of them are assigned
9
to the Studies and Requirements Division. They are:
^Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Development




Deputy for Studies Operations Analysis
Long Range Branch, Organization Defense Systems Analyst
& Operations Analyst
War Games Branch, Operations Analyst Operations Analysis
War Games Branch, Operations Analyst Operations Analysis
Individuals qualifying for the SEP requirements of these billets
are assigned by Headquarters Marine Corps. However, assignments
within the division are made by the Division Chief. This means that
final assignment of specially educated personnel is not made beyond
the division level. This then is the basic policy of assignment for all
division members. What does this mean in relation to Maslow's theory?
The most relevant need here appears to be the esteem
need. We all have need of status. To be assigned to a position in the
Marines by its highest headquarters brings a great deal of status. For
example, let us assume that the Corps has an existing need for a pro-
ject officer in the management of the study of some highly complex
weapons system for the midrange period. An individual, let us say
you, a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, receives orders from Headquarters
Marine Corps to report to the Studies and Requirements Division as
that project officer.
In Maslow's terminology these orders v/ould represent
feedback that verify your self concept. Such feedback will increase
your stature as the office which makes the assignment rises in
10 Development Center, Standing Operating Procedure , op. cit.
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importance also. In our example, it was the highest office in the
Corps which assigned you. As we have seen already, this is not in
fact the case.
The case as follows is much more likely to occur. You
receive orders to the Marine Corps Development and Education Com-
mand. When you arrive at Quantico, you are assigned to the Develop-
ment Center. (During this investigation there were 216 officers at
the Center. ) u From the Center, you are assigned to S&R, where you
are told by the Division Chief that you are going to the Mid-Range
Branch. The Head of the branch then, or in conjunction with the Chief,
assigns your final billet and with that billet comes the project or pro-
jects that you will be expected to manage.
Many project officers do not find the latter policy, which
is the one in effect, very satisfying. To change this procedure would
take an overhaul of Marine personnel assignment policies that lies far
outside the boundaries of this thesis. The effects of those policies,
however, lie very much within our limits. Let it suffice to say that
practically all the officers interviewed see no selectivity in the assign-
ment of project officers and that the nature of the work calls for
selectivity. This combination of the work itself and the lack of
selectivity in assignments creates an intervening variable of the first
order. It stems from an idea that all officers should be available for
10Development Center, Command Directory, op. cit.
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virtually any assignment. It is a factor that has long been a military
enigma.
b. Internal Assignment .
We have already seen that expectations play an important
role in the reaction of individuals to need fulfillment. Since the HQMC
policy is anticipated by the potential project officer, this factor appears
to be less significant in the Corps than it normally would be. This de-
centralized approach to personnel assignment has benefits for the sub-
stratas of management in that a great deal of power goes with it. This
power as far as our project officer is concerned lies with the Division
Chief and the Branch Heads. The project officers interviewed held high
expectations concerning need fulfillment in the assignment practices at
this level. These expectations were rarely met as the following com-
ments made by project officers will attest:
"We are not assigned a project, we are assigned an
empty desk and chair. "
"It takes a minimum of six months to even begin to
understand what you are supposed to do, a lot of guys
never do. "
"When I arrived here, I was given a chair, a desk,
and told to read some boring publications. A few
days later I was assigned my first project. "
**See Selznik, Janowitz, et al. , The Adaption of Complex
Organizations to Changing Demands , A report submitted to Director
of Defense Research & Engineering by the Research Group in
Psychology and the Social Sciences, (Smithsonian Institution, 1962).
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These are a few statements that reflect the internal assign-
ment policies of S&R as the project officers view them. They are directly-
related to Maslow's esteem needs in that they are all stating that; "No
one bothered to verify my self concept". "No one wanted to know how I
felt about my assignment. "
The project officers at S&R are all Majors and Lieutenant
Colonels. They have an average of fifteen years in the Marine Corps
and consider their past positions to be ones of relative autonomy. Their
training and experience has emitted a much greater significance to the
operator than to the planner, researcher or staff officer. Very few of
them have had prior experience in research and development. None have
had experience in the process of managing studies. They arrive ex-
tremely vulnerable. According to Maslow's theory, the present practice
of assignment is disfunctional for need satisfaction at the HQMC level,
but worse at the Division level. It is one that fails to be responsive to
any personal needs whatsoever. It is one that fails to take account of
the personal dimension.
The assignment of work runs parallel with the assignment
of personnel. The interest in every study on the part of the project
officer is assumed to be inherently high by the managers of the division.
The manner in which the officers receive their assignment is a topic




Project officers, without exception, perceive their work at
S&R to be both important and interesting. At the same time there is
much that is dis -functional in their efforts, for they all agreed that it
was extremely frustrating. None of those interviewed stated that they
would like a future tour with S&R, nor would they care to be associated
with any part of the Marine Corps R&D Community.
How do project officers feel about their work, about their
capabilities to perform and the realization of those capabilities on the
part of their supervisors? What needs, in accordance with Maslow's
Theory, are filled by managing studies for the U. S. Marines? The
ideal would be a working environment where self-actualization could
be realized. The environment at S&R was found by this investigator to
be somewhere between the level of fulfilling safety needs and social
needs. Again, it should be pointed out that the personal dimension has
not been recognized as existing by most organizations. Still S&R appears
to be filling a much lower range of needs than it is capable of.
The work of the project officer cannot be put into a vacuum.
It must be analyzed in relation to the other factors of the personal
dimension as well as with the factors of the other dimensions. As we
can see this work is rather creative in its extent.
The creative or innovative type work necessary for the solution
to S&R's problem is a function of the selection process already reviewed.
It is also a function of the environment or professional climate. In other

words, if we can't select them, perhaps we can groom them. How
does the climate effect the project officer?
4. The Professional Climate
The work within the Division is unique work in that every pro-
ject calls for innovation of a distinct nature. This is quite unlike the
climate that most project officers are accustomed to. This climate
includes the mundane work and the revolutions through which that work
must be processed that on the surface generates the frustrations so
clearly rampant throughout the division. Those interviewed referred
to the complete lack of indoctrination procedures and the administrative
procedures of the Center as the source of their frustration. In con-
junction with this, many perceived a hick of substantive comments
about their work from their superiors. Superiors' comments were
limited to criticism on grammar, format and style; and the amount of time
spent on this at successive levels of management was considered exces-
sive. As one officer put it, "They put someone in the job who knows
nothing about it, tell him to do it, but not how to do it, and then complain
about format of the final product, because they know less about substance
than we do. "
Comments such as this can be found at many other places
besides the Marine Corps. It is possible that they depict the situation
as it is. On the other hand, they could totally or, more realistically,
partially describe a defense mechanism on the part of individuals who
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frustrated about their own inabilities in the daily work that they are
required to perform.
In line with Maslow's need theory, these complaints could
display a realization, conscious or unconscious, that the highest of
the need hierarchy - self - actualization and esteem needs are blocked
for up to one year by the conscious recognition that project officers
are at quite a loss in their jobs. Many displayed the attitude that it
was not their fault, but the fault of the system. The system is ridiculed
especially by the newer officers.
The threat that this type of work presents, or more accurately,
the inability to understand and perform the work and thus fulfill one's
needs at the esteem level and above, are very real at S&R. Chris
Argyris, Professor of Industrial Administration at Yale University,
has this to say on the subject.
Generally speaking, there are at least two ways to reduce
feelings of threat. One is to change the self, so that it
becomes congruent with whatever is causing the difficulty.
This involves 'accepting' the fact one is 'wrong'. It in-
volves admitting the limitations associated with the dif-
ficulty and a willingness to change the self so that the
difficulty will not rise again. The second approach is
to defend the self by somehow denying or distorting
(consciously or unconsciously) what is threatening and
clinging to the present self concept. This behavior is
called a defense reaction
Defense mechanisms are therefore developed to be
used any time that the self feels threatened. All
individuals have a set of defenses. This set of
defenses is not to be viewed as necessarily being
bad or good. It is best to view them as simply the
individual's way of defending himself from threat.
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The four most frequently threatening experiences
are anxiety, conflict, frustration and failure. 12
Since frustration has been identified by the S&R project officers
themselves, it might be well to quote the professor on this experience
also.
"Frustration. Coupled with, and perhaps a special case of,
conflict, is the problem of not being able to overcome some
barrier in order to arrive at some goal. If the goal is not
reached the person will become emotional, uneasy, antag-
onistic - he will show signs of being frustrated. The person
under frustration does release emotions, whether he shows
these emotions in his observable behavior or not. These
emotions act like a sleeping pill, so to speak, on the per-
son's whole personality (especially his abilities) and reduce
his efficiency.
For example, prior to frustration the person's efficiency
is said to equal ten, under frustration it is usually reduced,
(e. g. , to five) without the person's realizing it (i. e. , un-
is wrong with himself .... This worry only increases the
emotional imbalance, which increases the action of the
emotions on the efficiency of the personality, and down
goes the efficiency some more. . . The thing that makes
frustration most destructive is that a person may not
know why he is less efficient.
. . .
Every person has developed his own tolerance
against frustration.
. . The individual's ability to
withstand frustration is known as frustration tolerance.
The higher the frustration tolerance, up to a point, the
more adaptive life will be. We emphasize 'up to a point'
because a person who never becomes frustrated, no
matter how difficult the situation, is not necessarily a
healthy person. "
12
C. Argyris, Personality and Organization, (New York:





The very nature of the work at S&R may well be the barrier
which causes project officer frustration. Certainly the inability to do
a job that is obviously expected by one's superiors constitutes a threat
to one's self concept which can easily surface; the first of Maslow's
psychological needs - the safety need. This could be applied to the area
of promotions for the project officer. At the least this frustration
could be correlated with the inordinate length of time it takes to become
accustomed to managing Marine Corps Studies.
The problem of indoctrination has recently been recognized
by the Center. Oral briefings are now being given to incoming personnel
and SOP's and Handbooks are being published. While this can be helpful
to the project officers administratively, it will do nothing for the area
of innovation.
Management at the Center must make an analysis of their
own attitudes toward innovation. Does the Division and Center really
want creative ideas, are they able to adapt to change, are they seriously
interested? The initial key to creativity is in the command's attitude
toward it. It must be evidenced constantly.
"Putting out brush fires" is a necessary chore, but it is not
a creative one. It breeds attitudes or urgency, restriction and rigidity.




A few of the approaches leading to a climate of innovation are
listed below: 14 ' 15 > l6
a. An open-door policy
b. A "Freedom to fail" attitude
c. Work assignments that are interesting and challenging,
with mobility in the organization
d. A Creativity Training Program
e. The Small Group Method (Team Method)
Mason (I960) states that many executives have heard of the
open door policy and think that they practice it. In reality, the door
might be open, but the mind is closed. All levels of management must
not only be available and approachable with new ideas, but must also
actively elicit them.
"Freedom to fail" is also required. Ideas, good or bad, lead
or should lead to ether ideas and these may provide the answer. A
problem here for S&R is that one idea, good or bad, rarely leads to
another because there are discontinuities in the communication's net-
work.
A creative training program is more a necessity than a luxury
at S&R. In industry the selection process takes care of much of this
See the following for further amplification on innovation
J. G. Mason, How to Be A More Creative Executive, (New York:
McGraw-Hill, I960).
F. Randall, "Stimulate Your Executives to Think Creatively",
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1955, pp. 121-128.






problem, but not so at the Development Center. The purpose of this
kind of training is not only to enhance the individual's output, but to
make him more receptive to the ideas of others. Thus, the individual
not only will understand the innovative process, but will help establish
the creative climate by being receptive.
The small group or team method has rapidly overtaken the
lone wolf approach to creativity in most R&D organizations. Large
groups have proven inadeqviate, for in them the individual can lose his
1
7
identity and then not assert his ideas. Small groups of the "think
tank" variety, a la The RAND Corporation and the Hudson Institute
correct this imbalance. This approach is totally absent at Studies and
Requirements. It returns as a topic in later chapters.
E. SUMMARY
What has this investigation uncovered thus far? What points can
we delineate as most important to the construct of our thesis? In one
sentence we can state that for S&R response to the personal dimension
does not exist in the areas covered.
Initially we set out the scheme of a theorist - Abraham H. Maslow -
and then clinically correlated the situation at S&R with the theory. We
have seen the following:
* 'See Milton and Green, The Group vs the Individual in Research
,
A technical paper submitted to the Operations Research Office, Depart-
ment of the Army, July I960.
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a. There is no organized selection of personnel at S&R.
b. Assignments are considered to be more of a function of
where an officer sits than his interests or abilities.
c. The work at S&R is considered to be unique; but it
presently takes an inordinate amount of time to
understand the work.
d. The majority of project officers feel frustrated.
e. The frustration probably emanates from an inability
to perform adequately.
f. An innovative climate is necessary, but absent.
g. The personal dimension is not explicitly recognized
in formal policy.
The above commentary is offered in the way of a summary for
this chapter. We shall offer some recommendations in the concluding
chapter of this tries is when our total case nas oeen constructed.
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III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION
A. THE THEORY
1. Introduction
On July 15, 1938, a distinguished gentleman in South Orange,
New Jersey, lay down his pen after completing a work that has had a
marked influence on the approach this paper has taken. That man was
Chester I. Barnard, a relatively unheralded senior executive of the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company. His book was titled,
1
8
The Functions of the Executive, and it is to the essence of his work
that we now turn for a source of theory in reviewing the organizational
dimension of the Studies and Requirements Division.
We shall follow the same path laid down in the last chapter.
A synopsis of Barnard's theory will be presented and followed by a
set of clinically observed variables that caused problems for the
division in attaining its goals of effectiveness. The danger of cultism
remains with us here as it did in our discussion of the personal
dimension. We must be aware of it.
The Functions of the Executive is a hallmark in organizational
theory. It can be stated that very few, if any, theorists on the subject




have not been influenced by Barnard's work. This is doubly potent,
for the book is exceedingly difficult. Any synopsis of it will lack a
great deal, yet any valid synopsis of it, no matter how lacking, will
be of value.
Barnard presented his theory as a statement of totality. It
was this sense of wholeness that made the book so unique in 1938, and
this same sense explains the continuing demand for it in 1971. His
approach was scientific. He had the capacity to reason in compound
systems of thought without losing his analytical grip. He derided other
theorists for viewing organizations in pieces. He was also alarmed
at the relative dearth of work in the field. For the field of organizational
theory, Chester Barnard clearly isolated the subject of organization
for the first time.
No mention of Barnard can be made that does not bring to
mind his famous definition of formal organization. On page 73 of the
30th Anniversary edition of the text we can find the following statement:
It is the central hypothesis of this book that the most
useful concept for the analysis of experience of coop-
erative systems is embodied in the definition of a
formal organization as a system of consciously
coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons.
This cooperation must be conscious, deliberate and purpose-
ful. What Barnard has done with this definition is to provide us with
a working dictum that is universaly applicable. He has done so in
the simplest of terms and by so doing has not only isolated a complex
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phenomena for precise analysis but has contributed immensely to
the science of living together.
Is it not true that relatively few formal organizations have
survived the test of time? Why is consciously coordinated activity
so difficult? What functions can be improved and refined in order to
enhance the chance for survival? On page 6 of the book Barnard states:
The survival of an organization depends upon the main-
tenance of an equilibrium of complex character in a
continuously fluctuating environment of physical, bio-
logical, and social materials, elements and forces,
which calls for readjustment of processes internal
to the organization. We shall be concerned with the
nature of the external conditions to which adjustment
must be made, but the center of our interest is the
process by which it is accomplished.
The functions of the executive with which the last part
of this treatise is concerned are those of control,
management, supervision, administration in formal
organization.
Readjustments in the internal process of an organization are
the focus of Barnard's theory, for these are the functions of the
executive. On a lower level of abstraction he describes the process
more specifically as creating, maintaining and facilitating in
organizations:
a. The willingness to cooperate
b. The ability to communicate
c. The existence and acceptance of purpose.
The ability to do these three things, according to Barnard,
does not come easily. It calls for the concrete synthesis of opposing
forces of the thought and emotions of human beings.
53

For our purposes here, it is necessary to understand that
organizations are dynamic creations that require the internal adjust-
ments of Barnard, which takes into account the interrelationship of
the adjustments. The implications of the functions of the executive in
this paper's terms are multi-dimensional. For example, an organiza-
tional change can and often does induce important effects in the social
life of the cooperators. The esteem of individuals can be affected and
the technical processes they had used in carrying out their work might
no longer be feasible. These multiple effects must be understood and
ironed out if the organization is to survive.
The processes of this organizational life are worthy of more
comment, for they are the essential elements of analysis that we will
utilize later on in this chapter to review the Studies and Requirements
Division in light of Barnard's thesis.
2. Willingness to Cooperate
How does the executive elicit a willingness to cooperate? It
is often assumed that one's mere membership in an organization is
reflective of a desire to cooperate. Willingness for Barnard con-
stitutes the surrender of control of personal conduct. This is accom-
plished by a whole range or degrees of commitment. We can produce
a scale from intense willingness to apathy to intense unwillingness.
Barnard believes that the "preponderance of persons in a modern
19




Another factor concerning willingness is the impossibility
for any individual to exhibit it in constant degrees. The author states
on page 85, "It is necessarily intermittent and fluctuating. " Willingness
is controlled by the satisfactions of needs or the dissatisfaction of needs
in relation to the expectations of the individual. "Organizations depend
upon the motives of individuals and the inducements that satisfy them. "
3. Purpose
On page 86 Barnard states, "A purpose does not incite coop-
erative activity unless it is accepted by those whose efforts will con-
stitute the organization. " A belief in that purpose on the part of the
contributors is helpful, but acceptance is essential. Attaining this
acceptance and belief in the purpose of an organization on the part of
subordinates is far more difficult an executive function than is com-
monly believed. The individual executive often gets caught up in a
whirlwind of sub -activities and often assumes too much in this area.
4. Communications
It should be obvious from the above that the dynamics of
inculcating a sense of common purpose throughout an organization
is communications. A purpose must be known before it is common,
and to be known it must be communicated. Verbal communications
are the most usual method here. A more difficult means is what






The techniques of communications are an important part
of any organization and are the preeminent problems of
many. The absence of a suitable technique of communica-
tions would eliminate the possibility of adapting some
purposes as a basis for organization. Communications
techniques shape the form of the internal economy of
organization. "
5. The Concepts of Effectiveness and Efficiency
Organizational effectiveness and organizational efficiency are
terms of measurement used by Barnard to assess organizational health.
Effectiveness is the accomplishment of recognizable objectives of the
organization. If the organization is not effective it will not survive.
The problem for most is the degree of effectiveness. This is a function
of the degree of accomplishment, which in turn rests on the essential
elements of analysis as a whole: willingness to cooperate, purpose and
communications.
Efficiency is quite a bit more difficult to grasp. It relates to
the satisfactions of individual motives. It is the resultant of the effi-
ciencies of the individuals furnishing the constituent efforts, that is,
as viewed by them.
If an individual finds his motives are being satisfied by what
he does, he continues his cooperative effort; otherwise he will decrease
that effort or cut it off altogether. Thus the inducements offered will





"It is efficiency in this sense and not the efficiency of material pro-
22ductiveness which maintains the vitality of organizations. "
Barnard is careful to show that the offering of economic
inducements to promote efficiency is not always vital. There are more
important inducements to man of a non. economic nature. Such things
as pride in craftsmanship, maintaining a character of personnel that
is an attractive condition of employment and prestige are a few of the
important contributions to organizational efficiency.
6. Informal Organization
Barnard coined the term "informal organization, " which has
now become a byword in the discipline. He states on page 115:
By informal organization I mean the aggregate of the personal
contacts and interactions and the associated groupings of
people that
. . . have no joint or common purpose but from
which arises a joint or common result.
Informal organizations are rather indefinite and structureless
but they have two important classes of effect: (a) they establish certain
attitudes, understandings, customs, habits, institutions, and (b) they
create the conditions under which formal organization may rise.
To explain the power of informal organization which is usually






. . . One of my valued correspondents, an army officer
of long experience in active service, writes to the effect
that I do not relatively emphasize this social incentive
sufficiently. Speaking of comradeship he says: 'I was
impressed somewhat to my innocent surprise, during
19 18, by the influence of this factor. I came out of the
war with the definite impression that it was perhaps the
strongest constructive moral factor, stronger than
patriotism, and in many cases stronger than religion. 1
The social need of belonging is the basis for informal organiza-
tion, and which in turn, is essential to the operation of every formal
organization. Many executives are completely unaware of the widespread
influences, attitudes and agitations within their organizations. This is
important since these informal units act as lines of communication,
maintainers of cohesiveness and maintainers of personal integrity.
Barnard's issue for executives is the point of how consciously
they carry out their functions. In a single phrase their function is the
coordination of action in a balanced fashion. For an organization to be
effective and efficient no less is required.
B. THE ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
It is now our task to relate the results of the investigation to
the body of our theory. To do that we shall take the essential elements
of analysis and attempt to discover the intervening variables. To find
if S&R has developed a "highly developed system of consciously coor-







e. Willingness to Cooperate
f. Effectiveness and Efficiency
2. Informal Organization
We can recall that Barnard states that informal organizations
create the conditions under which formal organizations may rise. This
is true of the Studies and Requirements Division.
24
Through correspondence and vocal communications the present
Chief of the Division advocated the conceptualization of a Marine Corps
counterpart to the Army's Combat Development Command (CDC).
These communications created an attitude (informal organization) that
was supportive of that idea. It was discovered during the investigation
that relatively few officers at S&R were acquainted with these facts.
If they were, not only would the power of an informal organization be
more appreciated, but the sense of purpose so visible in the corres-
pondence of the founder could be offered to the present members. We
shall discuss the latter further in the section on "Purpose".
The informal organization described thus far is one before
the fact. What informal organization is found in the division today?
This investigator found three distinct levels of informal organization.
This information was gathered from the personal letter file of
Colonel William P. Mitchell. Some twenty letters were in the file,
spanning a period from early 1966 to late 1968.
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These correlate with the three main branches of the Division: the
long range branch, the midrange branch and the requirements and
coordination branch.
The midrange branch was the focus of attention for a large
portion of this investigation, since twenty-four of thirty seven ongoing
projects were a function of that branch at that time. This is also the
largest sub-division within S&R having more than twice the number of
officers than any other branch. The basic attitude displayed was that
midrange was the working branch. There were few interactions between
the members of this branch and others outside it. This seemed true of
the entire Division. While the observation was cursory, it appeared
that there was little cohesiveness here, perhaps because even within
the branch there is little interaction.
The long range branch had twelve officers and constituted the
second largest sub-division of S&R. The attitude expressed here was
one of superior distinction or status. One individual interviewed con-
sistently referred to the branch as "the panel". This is an historical
reference to the fact that the branch was incorporated into S&R at the
Division's conception, but prior to that it had been a separate organiza-
tion in the Development Center known as the Long Range Panel. At
least a few members of it still consider it a separate entity.
The Requirements and Coordination Branch consisted of
eleven officers during the investigation. The primary attitude here
was that this was the most overworked and most misunderstood of any
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tmit. The investigator found very few outside the branch who knew what
its complete title was - it is referred to as the Requirements Branch;
and few had any understanding of their function.
The informal organizations of the Division are very weak.
Informal organizations are communications links. They act as a
bond promoting internal cohesiveness and allow the individual to retain
a degree of personal integrity in an impersonable formal organization.
They were found to exist in only skeletal fashion at S&R.
3. Formal Organization
The formal organization has been defined by Barnard as the
consciously coordinated activities of two or more people. The system
set up to carry out those activities at SfcR has been delineated in
Chapter I.
The main point is that the investigation uncovered a lack of
awareness on the part of those interviewed as to what that system was
outside their own sections and branches. Few had even seen an organiza-
tional chart of their own branch, much less that of another one. While
each branch is somewhat organized around the five functions of combat,
only one officer could state that he had counterparts in other branches.
Within the branches the integration of the five functions for any one
study was left up to the branch chief as there seemed to be no inter-





The purposeful activities of a formal organization are the
reason for its existence. These purposes can be found in Chapter I
of this thesis. A more poignant description of purpose lies in the
written communications of the Chief of the Division which were already-
cited. In a nutshell, these documents state that the purpose of the
Division would be to keep pace with other services, particularly the
Army in the fields of combat development. Combat development here
refers to concepts, doctrines, tactics and techniques or in R&D lingo -
software. These areas would be covered in an integrated studies
system that would require projections into the future of from two -
twenty years and the technical statements of those projections in the
form of requirements documents.
It was felt that this capability was urgently needed. Up to
this time, the greater portion of Marine R&D was allotted to the
testing of already developed equipment. A studies program was in
existence, but its efforts were splintered due to the lack of a single
manager. The McNamara Planning Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) with its emphasis on cost effectiveness was demanding
complete and intricate justification for the expenditures of development
funds. It was the Chief's opinion that without an integrated studies
program a danger would arise for the Marine Corps. This danger
would be the Corps forced acceptance of Army decisions which would
62

create Marine forces so similar to the Army in equipment, doctrine
and concepts that the very existence of the Corps would be in jeopardy.
How does all this meld with Barnard's theory? The Chief of
S&R convinced enough people in the upper echelons of the Marine Corps
that his outlook was correct. From our investigation, it appears that
few people at the other end of the spectrum, including many of his
own project officers, share that concern. Barnard states that a purpose
must be accepted by those engaged in the functioning of an organization
before cooperative effort can ensue. It appears that there are those
who understand their immediate purpose in writing or managing a
specific study, but the wider organizational purpose is either un-
accepted or unknown. There is little heed paid to common purpose
at S&R.
5. Communications
The present state of affairs at S&tR in which relatively few
accept the organizational purpose and only the Chief appears en-
thusiastic about it will continue until this same sense is communicated
to all officers
.
At the present time, it appears that the communications
process concerning organizational purpose has been aimed exclusively
up the chain of command but never down. The evidence for this comes
from observational feeling as well as the interviews themselves. The
manner in which some studies are discussed are examples here. The
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manner is contemptuous and the contempt is often supported by such
statements as:
a. "Who is the Marine Corps trying to kid? "
b. "We (USMC) are too small to be doing this kind of thing".
c. "The Marine Corps will never buy a major weapons
system unless the Army does; look at the Stoner
system. These civilian R&D outfits are just taking
taking us for a ride. "
d. "This whole thing is ridiculous. The Army has 6000
men doing the same job. Why don't we just test their
gear and buy what we want. "
e. "Every time the Marine Corps buys a system on its
own it ends up in disaster. Look at the Ontos and
the Mighty Mite. "
f. "We should be only involved in amphibious tractor
development and requiring salt water proofing on
desired Army equipment. "
g. "This place is analagous to a corner grocery store
trying to do a supermarket business. It will never
make it. "
While many of the comments made by members of the Divison
and Marine Corps R&D Community stem from a possible performance
inability as already discussed in the last chapter, they all indicate a
lack of acceptance of organizational purpose. Further evidence shows
that little or no effort has been attempted to inculcate a cohesive sense
of purpose in the minds of S&R members. The techniques of communica.
tion must be addressed in the solution to the problems of the Division.
As great a problem lies in the area of cross -communication which
shall be a topic in the next chapter.
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6. Willingness to Cooperate
Willingness to cooperate is basically a topic covered pre-
viously in the chapter on the personal dimension. The inducements
that satisfy the motives of individuals can be divided into economic
and non-economic motives. The non-economic motives cover the
entire range of human dimensionality as discussed in that chapter.
Project Officers at S&R consider the Director of the Develop-
ment Center's signature on their work as one of the satisfactions they
receive. This is rather impersonal to say the least, .however. The
importance and interest of the work also engenders cooperation.
Barriers to cooperation include such things as status, recognition,
lack of communication, and lack, of cohesiveness and communion
among fellow officers.
Most project officers feel that they are tasked with demeaning
jobs such as checking safes and windows on regularly assigned bases;
making all their own arrangements for temporary additional d\ity;
being forced to use sign out boards and writing memorandums for
the record.
7. Effectiveness and Efficiency
The effectiveness and the efficiency of the Studies and Require,
ments Division seems to be hampered by the following points:
a. The division executives do not appreciate the implications
of informal organization.




c. The formal organization is not understood outside
the individual's own branch.
d. Members do not accept the purpose of the formal
organization.
e. Little or insufficient effort has been made to com-
municate the purpose.
f. Members do not perceive that their motives are
being satisfied and thus are relatively unwilling
to cooperate.
Since S&R is producing studies, it is not effectiveness but the
degree of effectiveness that is the problem. This is another way of
saying that the studies themselves must be improved. The organiza-
tional deficiencies that hinder the competence of S&R studies are the
result of present executive processes and not the formal structure
itself.
Efficiency, as we have seen, refers to the capacity of organiza-
tional life to create personal satisfaction. It is an input to and an output
from the accomplishment of the work at hand. At Studies and Require-
ments the efficiency of organizational action is low. This is because
the work requires systematic applications of knowledge which is un-
known; the potential for self-actualization is blocked; and esteem and
recognition for accomplishing highly effective studies is not rendered.
One can see from the above that in order to promote an effective
and efficient organization, executive action must consciously address
all dimensions of human behavior. While we have desired to limit
this chapter to the organizational dimension alone, the work of
Chester I. Barnard has forced us to recognize this point early. In
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the next two chapters we will elaborate two other dimensions of
organizational behavior not yet discussed in this paper.
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IV. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION
A. THE THEORY
1. Introduction
Let us first dispel any tendency on the part of the reader to
believe that the social dimension is limited to cocktail parties, luncheons
or golf. It is not. It is a basic premise of the multi -dimensional theory
adopted in this paper that wherever mankind congregates in purposeful
activity all four dimensions, including the social exist.
Our primary theorist for the social dimension will be Professor
George C. Homans, presently Chairman of the Department of Sociology
at Harvard University. Professor Homan's credentials should ^e espe-
cially meaningful to those of us in the Naval Service. He spent World
War II in the U. S. Navy. For four and one half years he commanded
a series of small ships in antisubmarine warfare and convoy duties.
Many of the experiences he had during those years have been woven
into the works he has set down since that time.
One of those works, and the primary reference for this chapter
is a book written by him and published in 1950. That book is The Human
Group.
^See George C. Homans, "The Small Warship", American
Sociological Review, Volume 11, 1946, p. 295.
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2. The Human Group
Americans are taught adequate ways of thinking about
technology and organization; they are not taught adequate
ways of thinking about social systems. A leader cannot
examine the whole situation inside and outside his group
unless he has a method for taking up each element of the
situation in order and in its relations to the other ele-
ments. It is not enough to have a mystic sense of the
whole; nor is it enough to have intuitive 'social skills'
that, all too easily, lead up a dead-end street to the
'big time operator'. What is needed is explicit, con-
scious intellectual understanding, and this is what a
book like ours aims to produce. Even this is not
enough, but by all that is holy in the human spirit,
without this the rest is dust and ashes.
The Human Group is a work that presents a theory that allows
us to understand a social system in an explicit, conscious and intellec-
tual style. It is not a set of rules, but a method for analyzing a social
situation.
In his theory, Mr. Homans utilizes a conceptual scheme of
three interdependent elements of behavior; activity, interaction and
sentiment, as they relate to the external objective of group survival
and the internal objective of group solidarity.
Mankind is a unity in the sense that men the world
over placed in the same situations, or as a psychologist
might say in the same 'fields', will behave in the same
way - and we must include as a part of the field the
traditions handed down in a society from past genera-
tions. . . But our theory is that if we applied the same
kind of analysis to all the societies of men, we should
find that they were different because they possessed
in different degrees characteristics that are present
in all. 22
George C. Homans, The Human Group, (New York: Harcourt,




Homan's thesis is highly potent and applicable to our work
here. He tested his conceptual scheme by applying it to sociological
studies done on five diverse groups that included:
a. A work group in the Western Electric Company.
b. A street gang in a large urban center.
c. A family of South Sea islanders.
d. A New England village.
e. A group of engineers in an electrical equipment company.
He demonstrated that men do react much the same under a
given set of conditions. From this, he postulated a series of hypotheses
about social life that should be applicable universally. An example of
such a hypothesis follows:
A decrease in the interactions between members of a
group and outsiders, accompanied by an increase in
the strength of their negative sentiments toward out-
siders wui increase tuo frequency Oj. interaction and
the strength of positive sentiments among the members
of the group and vice versa.
A more simple example is this:
The more frequently persons interact with one another,
the stronger their sentiments of friendship for one
i -i 24
another are apt to be.
What we shall attempt in our analysis is a delineation of the
elements of behavior expressed by the members of the Studies and
Requirements Division and their relation to one another. We shall then
sketch those aspects of the elements that are blocking the division from




attaining a necessary degree of interpersonal competence. But, first,
let us describe the theory in more detail.
The unit of analysis utilized by Homans was the small group.
He believed that the group as such was a microcosm of society. The
group is defined by the interactions of its members. If a body of people
do not interact, then in Homans' terms they do not constitute a group.
In studying a group the total situation must be kept in mind, for as
Homans states, the behavior of members of a group is analogous to a
symphony - it may and probably will have its discords. These discords
could come from anywhere and be caused by any number of things. In
order to maintain a complex system in equilibrium it is necessary to
anticipate those discords or at least act on them when discovered.
The language of Homans is not impossible for the lay man to
follow, but it is different. To aid us in interpretation, a few of the
applicable terms used in his work are defined below.
a. External System: Group behavior that enables the
group to survive in its environment.
b. Internal System: Group behavior that is an expression
of the sentiments toward one another developed by the
members of the group in the course of their life together.
c. Group Norm: An idea in the minds of the members
of the group that can be put into the forms of a state-
ment specifying what the members should do under
given circumstances.
d. Equilibrium: A social system is in equilibrium and
control is effective when the state of the elements
that enter the system and of the mutual relationships
between them is such that any small change in one of
the elements will be followed by changes in the other
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elements tending to reduce the amount of that change.
In other words, when any change is followed by a
tendency of the system to return to its original state.
From this short sketch of the conceptual scheme for analyzing
the human group, let us move into our analysis.
B. THE ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
The Studies and Requirements Division may be thought of as
a social system. Homans defines a social system in terms of its
elements of behavior: the activities, interactions and sentiments of
group members, together with the mutual relations of these elements
with one another. It would seem appropriate then to commence our
analysis by listing the elements of behavior as they a pply to S&R. In
this effort, we shall quickly become intimidated by sheer numbers and
thus will concentrate exclusively on the project officers. To add to
our self imposed parameters we shall limit our listing to those elements
performed in completing a study. We have already noted that no two
studies are exactly alike, therefore, we will be forced to generalize a
bit.
2. Official Responsibilities of the Project Officer
Paragraph 5b of Chapter IV of the previously cited RD&cS
Handbook lists these activities and interactions for project officers:
(1) The Development Center project officer is responsible
for planning and executing a given study. He is directly
responsible to his branch or division head and is respon-
sive to the HQMC or DEVCEN Advisory Committees.
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(2) The DEVCEN project officer is responsible for the
conduct of a study effort. Normally he has the
responsibilities enumerated in subparagraph 5c.
c. Project Officer Responsibilities
(1) Marine Corps In-House Studies. For those studies
conducted in-house, the project officer will:
(a) Serve as leader of the study group
(b) Provide for the development of assumptions,
threat, scenario, and approach; and for the
procurement of planning factors and other
study inputs as appropriate. Initiate action
to obtain approval of the Advisory Committee
for the above.
(c) Direct the preparation of the study plan. Initiate
action to obtain study plan approval by the Advisory
Committee.
(d) Supervise the execution of the study, including
assignment of tasks to study personnel; the
preparation of the study report; and the com-
pilation of the distribution list for the report.
(e) Prepare and deliver presentations and briefings
of the study as required.
(f) When contractor assistance is employed, monitor
the work of the contractor and ensure that timely
contractor inputs to the study are accomplished.
(g) Prepare and submit study progress reports.
3. Observed Behavior
The above represent the officially required behavior of project





(1) Receive and review study directive.
(2) Contact individuals mentioned in the directive.
(3) Request clarification of study directive; if required.
(4) Prepare Project Budget Estimate.
(5) Prepare a Study Plan.
(6) Review applicable publications and studies.
(7) Submit requirements for contractor assistance.
(8) Commence Study.
(9) Check on input and output from external sources.
(10) Prepare progress reports.
(11) Submit first draft.
(12) Manage final editing.
(13) Submit final draft.
b. Interactions
(1) Discuss project with branch head, Division Chief and
interested senior officers at DEVCEN.
(2) Discuss project with others mentioned in Study
Directive in a supporting role.
(3) Discuss project with HQMC project officer.
(4) Discuss budget estimate with Division budget officer.
(5) Discuss requirements for assistance with external
agencies.
(6) Discuss progress with supporting personnel.
(7) Discuss timeliness with superiors.
(8) Brief superiors and committees.
c. Sentiments
(l)The Study Directive takes an inordinate period of time
to get to the project officer after arrival at the DEVCEN
reflecting an overabundance of do-nothing managers.




(3) The degree of interest exhibited by superiors is
important.
(4) It is better to rely on vocal answers than to
await correspondence.
(5) It is assumed that the project officer has the
expertise to do the job.
(6) It is assumed that the project officer knows who
to go to for assistance.
(7) It is assumed that all research materials are
available and that the project officer knows how
to get them.
(8) The project officer's time is wasted by petty
requirements.
(9) The project officer's status is low.
(10) Too much is expected of project officers.
(11) The studies are important, interesting, but the
work is frustrating.
(12) R&D work is not Marine Corps work.
4. Discrepancies and Additional Comments
There are a number of discrepancies between the activities
and interactions as observed and as officially stated:
a. The designated responsibilities stipulate that the project
officer will act as leader of the study group. This is
misleading. While a study group may be constituted
there is no group effort per se. The supporters do their
work alone as does the project officer.
75

b. An advisory committee is formed at HQMC for each
major study. It consists of representatives from sections
that have an interest in the project. It does not enter the
picture until progress reports are made and the final
study submitted. It does little advising with the exception
of the representative from the section that originated the
study. This individual is entitled the HQMC project officer,
A separate advisory committee is constituted at the DEVCEN.
The results of the investigation show that little utility is derived from
this committee due to its relative inactivity until the study is completed.
5. External System
For the Studies and Requirements Division, survival derives
from the combination of motives (sentiments), and communications
(interactions) that go into making a Marine Corps Study (activity). In
other words, the members of the S&R must meet the plans or purpose
of the Division, and they must be adequately motivated to do so. Other-
wise the Division will not survive.
Homans states that the sentiments that enter the external
system are those a man brings to a group from the other groups in
society of which he is a member. We have already stated that the
project officers enter the division as Majors and Lieutenant Colonels
with an average of fifteen years in the Corps.
Many of the positions previously held by these men called for
leadership, aggressiveness and accomplishment. Such phrases as,
76

"Be a leader of men", "The Corps builds men", "First to fight", etc.
,
are the prime recruiting slogans that the Corps has used for years.
Many of those interviewed expressed sentiments that were similar as
to why they joined the Marines in the first place. Before entering S&R
their motivation was reinforced by the elan that exists in the Marines
and the respect provided them by subordinates.
In most of their previous positions they made or participated
in a wide range of decisions. This was true whether they were fighter
pilots, tank officers, logistics staff officers , maintenance officers,
advisors, personnel officers, military instructors or military police-
men. By decisions, we mean they initiated action to which others
responded.
Upon their arrival at S&R most of them became restricted to
one or two projects. This is a form of specialization.
Homans states that, "an increasing specialization of activities
will bring about a decrease in the range of interaction of a person con-
cerned with any one of these activities and will limit the field in which
he can originate interaction. " In turn specialization creates growth
in group size and this will tend to increase the number of positions
between the top leader and the ordinary member.
This basic reduction of interaction from what the members of
S&R are accustomed to prior to their arrival and what they must become
25 Ibid, p. 406.
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accustomed to while there, presents a serious dilemma for the project
officer. The satisfactions that he had received as a leader, as a decision
maker, have been largely removed. He probably will never see the
results of a single study. At the same time the nature of the work calls
for innovative skills, deep reflection and an unusual ability that does not
come easily for most, never for many. This means that greater moti-
vation is required for far less satisfaction.
6. Internal System
Recall that Homans defined the internal system as group
behavior that is an expression of the sentiments toward one another
developed by the members of the group in the course of their life
together. In other words, this is the behavior -- activities, sentiments
and interactions -- developed on the job but not dictated by it. This is
very close to Barnard's "informal organization".
We found that interactions necessitated for the purpose of pro-
ducing studies (External System) are almost non-existent within the
division itself. A sentiment that was often expressed during the investi-
gation was that there was a lack of social cohesiveness. This is not
surprising. Homans states:
"If the interactions between members of a group are
frequent, in the external system, sentiments of liking
will grow up between them, and these sentiments will
lead to further interactions, over and above the inter
-




This does not occur at S&cR, which explains the weakness of
the informal organization. Homans also states the following:
"As the range of a man's interaction declines, as he
interacts less often with the leaders of his group,
and as the field in which he exercises authority
27becomes more limited his social rank will decline. "
We could just as well substitute the terms of Maslow - esteem
and self-esteem,here for social rank. We can see from this that ac-
cording to Homans theory the position of project officer in the internal
system of S&R calls for a lowering of social rank.
7. Group Norms
Homans definition of group norms has already been provided.
We can sum it up in three words _ normally expected behavior.
Homans states that to understand any expression of opinion we
must look at three factors: situation, sentiment and norm. The situation
an individual finds himself in will create certain sentiments. These
sentiments in turn, will be influenced by group norms. Often the norm
is more powerful than the sentiment. An example is the high school
student who realizes drug misuse is personally harmful but who con-
descends to that misuse due to social pressure.
A few group norms as expressed at S&R are as follows:
a. Do your own thing as a project officer.
b. Do not interact with others, in the course of your





c. Do not expect either help or reward at S&R.
d. Complain about mismanagement, but never to the
managers.
e. The project officer will become "the expert".
f. Act like you know what you are doing.
g. You won't like working here and you'll be glad to leave.
C. SUMMARY
What does all this mean? In Homans terms there is significant '
social conflict growing in the division. Much of the social conflict
stems from the lowering of social rank as perceived by project officers
assigned the division and some of it sterns from the recognized divergence
of group norms from operational reality.
Equally important is the lack of social cohesiveness. By limiting
interactions in the external system (job related activities) feelings of
friendliness toward fellow officers are not enhanced. On top of this,
the officer is placed in an extrmely threatened position by the difficul-
ties of the tasks he must perform.
One way to overcome some of these problems is to create a true
inter-branch team for each project rather than isolating project officers
as is now the case. Douglas McGregor provides us with a word of
warning on the team concept.
"Often 'teams' are not teams at all, but collections
of individual relations with the boss, in which each
individual is vying with every other for power, pres-
tige, recognition and personal autonomy. Under such
conditions, unity of purpose is a myth. "
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Through real teamwork, growing out of genuine social cohesions
many of the problems described in this chapter could be solved.
The following main points have been made:
a. Assignment to S&-R means a lowering of social rank.
b. Project officers do not interact frequently in the
division's external system and therefore, a viable
internal system does not develop.
c. Project officers conceive of their interactions with
superiors as stumbling blocks.
d. Group norms are not consistent with operational
reality, and this is perceived by the project officers.
e. Due to a. and d. an incipient social conflict has
developed in the division.
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V. THE TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSION
A. THE THEORY
1. Introduction
"The term technology refers to all disciplines designed to
achieve controlled changes in natural relationships by means of pro-
28
cedures that are scientifically based. " Science, on the other hand,
has an explanatory and descriptive purpose. The object of these ex-
planations and descriptions is understanding of nature itself.
2. The Practice of Science and the Science of Practice
Ernest Greenwood in his short treatise entitled, "The Science
of Practice and the Practice of Science", calls for an integration of the
efforts of scientists and technologists or perhaps what we could call
theorists and practitioners. It is this work and its thesis that we will
utilize in this chapter on the technological dimension.
Greenwood's work discusses the relationship between science
and technology as they are manifested in sociology and social work.
For our purposes we shall use the general ideas he develops as they are
applicable to the work of the Studies and Requirements Division.
The disciplines called for in managing a formal study for the
Marines have their bases in science. It is Greenwood's thesis that the
"Ernest Greenwood, "The Practice of Science and the Science of
Practice", in Bennis, ed. , The Planning of Change, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 74.
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theorists involved in such disciplines should collaborate with those
involved in the practical use of them. This is rarely done. Scientists
or theorists, whichever is preferred, generally go their own way, which
is often to an end of the spectrum of life opposite that of the practitioner.
The same can be said in reverse. The only ties between the theorist
and the practitioner seem to be a few written words placed down on
paper for posterity. How more beneficial for all of us would it be if
they would interact together? Greenwood believes that the results of-
their cooperative behavior would help us far more quickly and effectively
than is now the case.
Greenwood states that the world is too complex to be properly-
observed by any one discipline, so that a division of labor is needed.
The resultant knowledge gained by specializing in a distinct science is
immense, but this knowledge is gained at a cost , and that cost is
experienced in the difficulty of attempting to reintegrate the disciplines
in an effort to understand the world as a totality. This division has been
accomplished by scientist of both physical and social phenomena.
Technologists are characterized by the manner in which they
apply knowledge to specific problems. Technologists, then, are those
practitioners attempting to control situations, while the scientists are
those theorists attempting to explain and describe them.
The system of thought which describes and explains situations
is called a theory. Greenwood states that the function of all science
is to construct theories about the what, the how, and the why of the
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natural world. Greenwood utilizes Durkheim's Suicide: A Study in
Sociology as an impeccable model of theory construction, and demon-
strates how a theory is built.
First Durkheim listed the available facts on suicide such as:
a. Countries with high literacy rates have higher
suicide rates than countries with low literacy.
b. Christians have higher suicide rates than Jews.
c. The unmarried have higher suicide rates than the
married.
d. The divorced have higher suicide rates than the
married.
e. The childless married have a higher suicide rate
than the married with children.
After listing this data and much more, Durkheim asked:
What common thread runs through these facts? He then looked into
each fact and speculated on propositions that would explain this
phenomenon. The common thread he found was a well integrated group
which holds its members together by means of strong bonds. In a
single sentence he postulates his theory as
"Suicide is a function of the degree of group integration
which provides the psychic support to group members
for handling acute stress. "
The above is a simplistic model of theory construction, but
should aid us in understanding the manner in which theories are built,
as well as provide us with some further insights into the problems
under discussion in the previous chapter on social organization.
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Technology, or theory put into practice, on the other hand,
consists of principles prescribing ways of controlling nature. This is
another way of defining problem solving. Greenwood states that prac-
titioners have the following characteristics:
a. They are action-oriented. They desire to resolve
problems by applying knowledge in a practical manner.
b. The practitioner is individual focused. At any one
moment he is engrossed in the particular problem
before him.
c. The practitioner is artistic. This derives from the
necessity of utilizing skill in problem solving.
d. The practitioner utilizes intuition. This derives
from the fact that theory cannot be applied to every
specific problem, but must be generalized. The
transfer of general knowledge to particular problems
calls for intuition.
Greenwood sees two personalities that can be of help in the
unification of theory and practice. These are those scientists who are
applied-oriented and those practitioners who are theory-oriented.
"The practice setting offers to the scientist a laboratory
with live situations and potentials for experimentation.
It opens up to him new sources of data contributing
toward the corroboration and extension of scientific
theory. "29
The benefits for the practitioner, on the other hand, will be
elicited from less intuitive skills and more cognitive understanding.
"Understanding, in turn, consists of description and
explanation, which is the function of science. There-









Greenwood sums up his thoughts by stating that some institu-
tional readjustments will have to be made before his proposed integration
can take place. Isolated theorists and isolated practitioners have done
marvelous work by themselves. Together they can do even better, but
before this happens the rewards for this marriage will have to be great
enough to overcome many years of inertia.
B. THE ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
It would be presumptuous to believe that the Studies and
Requirements Division has already integrated the fields of theory and
practice as advocated by Ernest Greenwood. Greenwood, of course,
is speaking on a higher level cf abstraction than is applicable to the
situation at Quantico. It is our job here to close that gap.
Greenwood's analysis of specialization and the problems
of reintegrating the knowledge gained from this process is analogous
to the difficulty of the artillery project officer that we introduced in
Chapter I. In that case, the specialist was unable to view his project
from outside his area of expertise. The result was a study in fire
support that did not address the mobility of fire support. Thus, at a
different level of abstraction we can see that Greenwood is observing
the same phenomena that we are.
We do not see the theoretical or scientific role as defined by
Greenwood to be applicable directly to the Studies and Requirements
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Division. Greenwood stressed the relation between science and tech-
nology. We are more concerned with the relations between technology
and operations. We see the project officer in the role of operator and
the specialist to whom they must turn for advice in the role of technolo-
gist or technical specialist. These two groups are distinct forms of
practitioners, and it is a union of the two ways of thinking employed by
these two groups that must be made.
The integration must be accomplished both between the tech- •
nologist and operator and among the operators and technicians themselves,
An education program in such technical fields as systems analysis,
operations analysis, financial analysis, and accounting could be the
prime mover in initiating the collaboration of the technologist and the
operator. An organizational development program could be helpful in
producing a union of the efforts of the project officers representing
varied specialties and timeframes.
2. Studies
The methodology of studies calls for a number of varied dis-
ciplines. Technical knowledge of the subject is required, as are
economic analysis, systems analysis and often procurement and con-
I
tracting. The average project officer, before assignment to S&R is
an operator at gut level, and it is rather difficult to envision him employ-
ing systematic knowledge in the tradition of applied science the minute
he enters the door of Studies and Requirements. Yet, the work calls
for much reasoning in the abstract. The ability to think in the jerms
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described in Chapter I does not come easily. It rests a great deal
on the theoretical.
Early in our argument, we saw that the initial statement of the
problem could be put into the form of the question: How do we turn
operators into planners? With many qualifications, it might also be
stated this way: How do we turn practitioners into theorists? According
to Greenwood, one does not. To gain the desired result, one must
integrate the inputs of theorist and practitioners by a collaborative
effort on their part. The same could be said of operators and tech-
nologists.
This approach leaves us with a need to discover more about the
disciplines required to produce the desired type of Marine study. We
have already seen that the project officers are relatively isolated at
S&R, especially within it. According to Greenwood, an institutional
reorientation is required to break that isolation.
The required disciplines, as we realize, have already been
included in the proposed educational solution to our problem. Those
disciplines are:
a. Organization: Theory and Practice
b. Systems Analysis
c. Accounting
d. Industrial Organization/Procurement h Contract
e. Operations Analysis
Organizations and the need for detailed study of it have already
been alluded to in Chapter III. Before inspecting the other four dis-
ciplines let us inspect how the technical competence of our project
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officers is utilized. This will be an exercise in the mutual dependence
of the dimensions also.
3. People and Assignments
Much of the discussion here is related to what we have already-
seen in Chapter II. An added light to it was discovered in the following
quote made in 1950 by a then Marine Captain at Northwestern University.
"If an employer is to solve the problem of putting the
'right man on the right job', that, employer needs
two kinds of information. First, he must have informa-
tion about the man who is being considered for the job
and second, he must have information about the require-
ments of the job to be filled. While this may seem al-
together too obvious, it was not until comparatively
recent times that employers recognized the fact that
both the man and the iob must be given consideration
^ 1
if an efficient organization is to be attained. "01
In this extract written twenty-one years ago, wc sec evidence
of the dependence of the three dimensions mentioned - personal (man),
technological (job), and organizational. It is no accident that we have
used this quote, because the writer is today the Commanding General of
the Development Center.
Greenwood is writing for a civilian audience who have chosen
their fields to some extent, at least. This is not true of most project
officers at S&R. This divergence must be kept in mind and everything
possible done to alleviate the lot of the project officer.
3 1 Lawrence Fontaine Snoddy, Unpublished Manuscript, A Survey of
the Duties Assigned to Enlisted Marines Serving with NROTC Units,
A thesis in partial fulfillment for the Master of Arts degree Evanston,




An introductory word on the systems analysis approach should
be beneficial for many readers. Systems analysis has evolved out of
Operations Research techniques which were utilized with great effect
by the Allies during World War II. Mathematicians and statistical
analysts as well as physical scientists were predominant and still are
in operations research. In systems analysis a wide variety of profes-
sional skills is indispensable. It is the interdisciplinary character of
this work which above all else distinguishes it from operations analysis.
The concept of systems analysis is difficult to define precisely.
The term "system" generally came into use to denote an effort to be
more comprehensive than the traditional operations analysis study.
Systems analysis, as it is referred to at such Defense oriented R&D
organizations as the RAND Corporation for example, seeks to consider
more than the use of a particular weapon in a single operational context,
and generally attempts to take into account all the relevant factors
32
affecting a complex problem under investigation.
A "system", then, means a new weapons system, for example,
and all the interrelated economic and strategic considerations associated
with its development. The systems study must take great care to define
the parameters of the subject it proposes to analyze. Realistic assump-
tions and definite relevant variables are vital for a useful study. The




object of the study is to identify various feasible alternatives under
conditions of great uncertainty. It can be rigorously mathematical or
more concerned with qualitative factors that affect decision making.
As in any discipline, systems analysis has its own language.
The investigation conducted for this thesis turned up a general apprecia-
tion for that linguistic system at S&R, but little for the substantive
meaning of systems analysis, especially of a mathematical orientation.
In planning Marine Corps organization, doctrine, tactics and techniques
into the mid and long range time frames it would appear that systems
analysis would have to be applied in some form to produce a useful study.
Unlike RAND, S&R does not have a wide range of interdisciplinary
scientists locally available. (The work of such men is sometimes con-
tracted for at centers like the Stanford Research Institute. ) This is
hardly conducive to the melding of theory and practice a la Greenwood.
Within S&R's own asset, however, are a wide range of interdisciplinary
practitioners. At this writing, they are isolated, yet the work calls
for a systems approach. Greenwood is correct in expressing concern
for an institutional reorientation, for that is what seems to be needed
at S&R just to get its practitioners together.
5. Accounting
Accounting concerns the collecting, summarizing, analyzing
and reporting of business data. It does not enter the work of our project
officers. The Division has a budget officer who acts as the specialist
when the need arises. Responsibilities here are limited to the budgeting
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of the study only. No study reviewed during the investigation caused
the project officer himself to account for implementation costs. Cost
benefit analysis does appear somewhat common, although external
support is called on to perform it.
The budgeting of a study is an important task in itself. The
Program Budget Estimate mentioned earlier is the tool utilized to per-
form this function. Study project objectives must be translated into
statements of research tasks for internal and external contractor sup-
port. Accounting is presently a secondary problem, but only because
there are so many others of higher priority.
6. Industrial Organization
Managing Marine Corps studies can involve some interaction
with industrial organizations. These companies will usually be of the
DOD contractor type such as Martin- Marietta. In this relationship, an
understanding of procurement and contract administration would be use-
ful. The statement was made during the investigation that most project
officers do not even read the contracts that involve their work. This
could be alleviated by a closer understanding - an explanation and
description of industrial organizations, particularly those involved with
R&D work.
7. Operations Analysis
Operations analysis has already been mentioned in the systems
analysis section. It can be defined as a procedure which studies all
aspects affecting an operation in order to achieve maximum economic
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benefits. For every text on the subject, one can fine another definition,
but the one above is as representative as any.
S&R's use of Operations Analysis techniques is limited. For
assistance, the project officer is referred to a section of the Marine
Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG). At the time of the investiga-
tion this section was extremely small and limited. They had but five
members at Quantico, although aid could be received from their parent
organization. All S&cR studies are supposed to utilize Operations
Analysis techniques. However, understanding, even when to use or
who to go to for this important tool was often absent at S&cR.
C. SUMMARY
None of the project officers at SckR is expected to be an expert in
any of the disciplines mentioned here, although some are. What we can
isolate from Greenwood is that if operators (our project officers) would
understand technical applications of scientific theory, even superficially,
a better result would be produced.
Results at S&R are studies. We have seen that the technical
disciplines of systems analysis, accounting, operations analysis, and
industrial organization are utilized in various degrees in their production.
These disciplines, in conjunction with the technical experience of the
officers, provide the basis for the scientific approach that should be




"We have seen in this chapter that:
a. An interdisciplinary approach to studies is required.
b. That one theorist believes that practitioners and theorists
should collaborate.
c. That at S&R there is no collaboration of anyone.
d. That project officers are basically practitioners who
have been confined in the past to operations, but who
must think in abstract terms at S&R.
We can now see a dual problem at S&R. One problem stems from
the technical inexperience of the project officers and the second problem
stems from the inability to integrate the work of project officers
sufficiently.
In the first problem area, we can identify the S&P. Project Officers
as operators and the technical specialists available as technologists.
These specialists include: the Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group,
internal and external civilian contractors and, in general, all technical
assets available to the Division. The project officers must be able to
communicate with and utilize the assets to produce effective studies.
How can this be done without providing project officers an understanding
of what these specialists can do? It cannot! At present, it takes six
months to one year (and sometimes it never occurs), before the project
officer comes to understand the technical assistance available to him.




The second problem is a sub-set of a larger organizational dilemma.
The dilemma is addressed in the statement of thesis, as well as the
paper as an entire entity.
The more immediate area of concern is the problem of an integration
of the efforts of the project officers. This would not appear to be a
problem for a military unit. If a senior desires a subordinate to work
together, he so orders, and so it is, and can be in most military units.
However, the Studies and Requirements Division is a very unusual
military unit. The work there calls for a personal commitment of a
very different nature than is required at an infantry battalion or fighter
squadron. Creativity and innovative thought processes cannot be ordered.
A different approach to management is required at S&R.
It follows that the managers of S&R are as much a part of the overall
problem as the deficiencies they have observed in their project officers.
This, as is true of the case of the project officers, is no fault of their
own. It is the resultant of a different mix of multi-dimensionality than
they have before experienced. Therefore, as an educational program is
required for the project officers, so too is one required for the managers.
This can be identified as an organizational development program.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. TOWARD TOTALITY
1. Introduction
The road we have chosen in this paper has been lengthy and
complex. To investigate the coordinated activities of a large number
of individuals in a newly formed unit, requiring intricate combinations
of knowledge and experience has necessarily made it so. To accomplish
such a task a systematic method to incorporate the entire range of
human behavior in order to provide some feasible options for progress
is demanded. That framework, for us, has been the multi-dimensional
model which exhausts all aspects of life into recognizable sub-sets.
Had not this model been available, this thesis would have been likewise.
In this our final chapter, we shall attempt to sum up our
analysis and state the conclusions and recommendations that follow
from it. In so doing, we shall attempt to tie together the four dimensions
we have addressed. For if nothing else has been learned by the writer,
a great deal has been established in his thinking about the mutual
dependence of the several dimensions 01 behavior in an organizational
system.
We have attempted to be neither excessively subjective, nor
excessively objective in this work. As a U. S. Marine investigating
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a U. S. Marine unit we realize that we are a part of the problem we
perceive. We welcome that realization.
Our solution in the abstract involves all of us in growing and
changing as persons, both alone and as members of groups. To grow,
to change, we must become aware of, and integrate within our own
thinking, the ideas, views and values of others. This is no easy task,
yet ours is no easy problem. The complexity of the individual magnifies
exponentially as those individuals come together to work, to study, to
play - to be. The solution calls for a systematic way of thinking that
will account for the wholeness of human behavior.
Max Weber in his renowned work, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization, stated that the bureaucratic organization has
advanced because of its technical superiority. Ideally this system
eliminates from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal,
irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation. It is plain
to us today that the ideal is only attained on paper. To attempt to
remove from life that which is immovable is not only an approach
that is fruitless, it may be an approach that leads to disaster. It is
an approach we have consciously avoided in these pages.
2. Thesis
In utilizing the multi -dimensional model, we have also been




Thesis: That the problems of the Division arise less from
deficiencies along any one dimension of organiza-
tional process than from the difficulties arising
from the mutual dependence of all dimensions in
fulfilling the organization's purpose.
It follows that solutions to these problems will meet with
either partial success or failure, unless the implications of each
problem are considered in light of all the dimensions. Our proposed
solution must therefore entail a dynamic balancing of emphasis on all
the dimensions in order to maintain equilibrium.
In seeking to reach this balance, much flexibility of thought
is required. No one can state that the personal dimension, for example,
should be emphasized at a specific level for a specific amount of time.
This means that mistakes will be made. Let us accept these mistakes
as necessary and be willing to live with them.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Introduction
Let us now review the results of the investigation along each
dimension and thus weld them together. We must keep in mind through-
out this summary the contributions that an educational program can
offer and that no two people will receive the same degree of satisfaction
or competence from any effort.
Much of the overall problem found in the Division can be
stated in the following terms:
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a. Along the personal dimension - a frustration of esteem
needs
b. Along the social dimension - a diminution of social rank
c. Along the organizational dimension - an impaired willing-
ness to cooperate
d. Along the technological dimension - a practitioner in a
theorists role.
These seemed to be the intervening variables in obstructing
effective actions within the Division. Let us consider each in turn.
2. The Personal Dimension
The personal dimension at S&R, as in most organizations, '
was not given sufficient attention. We have seen in our section on
selection and assignment that the personal viewpoints of those con-
cerned are not elicited in most cases. We have also seen that the
nature of the work is such that an individual's views concerning
creativity and innovation are important. At the same time, the
expectations of Marine officers, in general, do not include a presump-
tion that their personal views will be considered important.
We have also seen that the military believe that any officer
can fill virtually any assignment. This combination of the work,
individual expectations, and organizational assumptions, creates a
barrier that leads to frustration. Most officers assigned to the
I
Division have neither the background nor desire to do the work at SfkR.
This gives rise to a set of defense mechanisms such as the condem-




Recall that the indivdual responds to all dimensions simul-
taneously and that all the dimensions are interrelated. From the
personal level, the most inherent disfunction at S&R is the difficulty
of fulfilling the esteem needs of individual project officers. It follows
that the primary goal for the executives of S&R, from this personal
frame of reference, is to provide an atmosphere in which attaining
esteem will be facilitated.
That atmosphere may be constructed from the following:
(a) Recognizing individual merit and desires.
(b) Facilitating interaction among all division members.
(c) Providing the technical guidance for improving studies.
(d) Inculcating all personnel with the organization's purpose.
It can be seen from this that the dimensions are related.
Along the personal dimension, the goal is to fulfill the esteem need.
To satisfy this need, a project officer must be capable of producing an
efficient study (technological dimension), in an organization whose
purpose he accepts (organizational dimension) and whose personnel
recognize and accept him (social dimension). To attempt to provide
esteem without alleviating the problems in the technological, organiza-
tional and social frames of reference is in a word, impossible.
An educational program can be helpful in solving the problem
from the perspective of technical expertise, but this in itself is not
enough. To be technically proficient at producing studies in an organiza-
tion which does not reward individual merit, and which no one believes
in, and whose personnel do not interact together on functional problems
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does not lead to the degree of esteem called for at S&R. This does
not mean an educational process of some kind is not required, for it
is. It does mean that an educational solution cannot stand alone.
3, The Social Dimension
The social dimension within S&R itself was, as we have implied,
relatively undeveloped. We saw in our earlier discussion of the organ-
izational dimension in Chapter III that informal organization is a power-
ful phenomena that can create cohesiveness. In our consideration of •
personal space we saw the importance of the esteem need; obviously
it would be difficult to satisfy without interaction. Even in technological
space we see a need for the interaction of two types of thinkers.
We have seen that for at least the first six months the incoming
project officer found his social rank lowered. He no longer made fre-
quent decisions, nor did he interact frequently. At the same time,
the norms of the group he worked with did not relate to the initial
capabilities of the individual. These two factors lead to what George
Homans has called social conflict.
The arrested development of the social dimension in any
organization whose people value it highly can cause high degrees of
individual stress. It must be considered with the same care given to
personal considerations.




a. Facilitates participation of project officers on assign-
ments.
b. Facilitates interaction among members of the Division.
c. Closes the gap between group norms and reality.
Again, we must recognize the interdependence of the dimensions,
Increased interaction will lead to a rise in social rank for those who
produce effective studies. We know that a study must address all five
functional areas of combat and that each project officer is a specialist
in one area. Interaction can be increased by a team member input from
each functional area on each study. However, unless the individual
project officer is technically proficient and exhibits this proficiency to
those supporting his study, his social rank will not rise.
This is an example of the mutual dependence of the social and
technological dimensions. The Division executives cannot guarantee
that every project officer's social rank will be enhanced, but only pro-
vide the avenues along which this is possible. The rest is up to the
project officer himself.
An educational program will partially supply in varying degrees,
the technical proficiency needed to increase social rank. It is our
opinion that to effectively demonstrate how the increased technical
superiority can be utilized and to provide a receptive atmosphere for
such an educational aid, an organizational development program is
required.
4. The Organizational Dimension
The organizational dimension at Studies and Requirements
was not denied in any way, but not enough was done to nurture it.
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The functions of the executive need to be consciously exercised, the
more consciously the better. They were not at S&R. If the personnel
do not accept an organization's purpose, their commitment to the work
itself will only be superficial at best. Morale (a traditional name for
willingness to cooperate) will be low and there will be no re-ward for
cross -communications
.
It is implicitly assumed at S&R that individuals, upon entering
the division, will agree with its purpose, will willingly cpoperate and
will automatically be entered into the stream of communications. Our
investigation found that this is not so. In fact, the reverse pattern was
more in evidence.
An educational program aimed at increasing the technical
proficiency of project officers is not as applicable here, as a program
aimed at the executive level of the division. For purposes of delineation,
we will now divorce such a program from the technical one described
above and entitle it the organizational development program.
As mentioned, our audience for this program will be the
executives of the Division. These are the Division Chief, the Deputy
Division Chief, Branch Heads and Assistant Branch Heads. Such a
program's primary aim would be to provide a working milieu, in which
the multi-dimensional scheme used here could be described, discussed
and put into action.
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5. The Technological Dimension
Concern with the technological dimension, and the belief that
placing more emphasis on it held the solution to the problem in the
Division, generated this study to begin with. We can recall that it was
a search for tools and techniques that established the feasibility of an
educational program of some kind.
We conclude that this is an important factor in the life of the
Division, but does not constitute a sufficient basis for a solution to the
problem. We have noted that one theorist believes a collaboration
between practitioners and theorists is a universally useful step. We
have abstracted this principle and applied it to the Division in the form
of a union between technologists and operators. We have identified most
project officers as operators. We can further identify those who would
provide an education program as technologists.
The nature of the daily work at S&R requires the application of
a number of disciplines of knowledge. At minimum, it calls for the
ability of knowing when to call for the assistance of specialists, and
how to communicate with them once they are called. The inability to
do the work of the Division was one of the prime sources of divergence
between group norms and experienced reality, which added to the
growing social conflict in the division. This inability was also the
barrier which caused frustrations for the individual and created the
defense mechanisms that added to the barrier. It may well be that
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this was the principal reason why there was such a lack of interaction
in the external system of the Division.
By bringing together the operators of the Division and the
specialists available to it, the production of effective studies will have
a far higher probability. An education program can provide the common
ground for this union. The educators in the role of experienced tech-
nical specialists can offer broad, general systems of thinking that will
aid in recognizing the need for applying specific technical expertise to
any project. The technical education program from the project officer's
perspective, in conjunction with an organizational development program
from the executives' perspective, is a way to promote balanced approach
to organizational effectiveness and organizational efficiency.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. General Recommendations
Our recommendations must necessarily be limited. We shall
try to offer them with some semblance of priority but must point out the
danger of priorities in our multi-dimensional scheme. Our general
conclusion is
:
That the solution to the problems of S&R requires an
awareness of the multidimensional milieu in which
organization members function; and second, an
effective program for bringing all dimensions of
behavior into balance.
If we have been successful in describing the four dimensional
scheme used in this study, and if we have been successful in depicting
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the division in terms of it, our work could end here. We recognize,
however, that this is an assumption that should not be made since
thinking along multiple dimensions of process is a complex process,
if not a radical one. In recognition of this difficulty we shall endeavor
to list only some specific and, what we believe may be, feasible recom-
mendations for action.
2. Recommendations for An Education Program
We have already seen the utility of an education program from
the perspective of each dimension. This utility is high but in itself is
not enough. We shall address what else is required in the next section.
Four of the applied disciplines recommended are basically
technical in nature. That is, they could enhance the procedural analysis
that goes into the development of Marine Corps Studies. These dis-
ciplines are:
a. Systems Analysis




These have been listed in the order of priority that we feel
will be most beneficial. We have omitted the fifth subject - organiza-
tional theory and practice - in the belief that it is worthy of separate
emphasis. We will not discuss the individual disciplines here, but
will state their collective contribution to the work of S&R.
One of the primary problems of the individual at S&R was
found to be the work itself. Besides the tools named, the work must
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have an innovative sense that is inborn or bred through the creation
of an atmosphere that rewards it.
The effects of an education program should be useful, but only
if that program is offered to the right people at the right time in the
right atmosphere. Accordingly, the executives at S&tR will have to
gauge such variables carefully before proceeding. In general, our
recommendation is that an educational program should be presented,
organized around the disciplines presented above.
3. Recommendations for An Organizational Development Program
The discipline of Organizational Theory and Practice has its
own special meaning for a solution to the division's problems. Rather
than being thought as an input to Studies Processes, per se, it is
thought to be more appropriate as an internal input that can address the
general recommendation of this thesis, and lead as well to the creation
of an atmosphere of innovation. This input has been entitled, The
Organizational Development Program. The dissemination of organiza-
tional purpose and the acceptance of it cannot be taught; it must actually
be experienced. How is this accomplished?
To obtain progress in these areas, an educational program
cannot be directed solely at those who produce the Studies. It will
take a certain amount of executive action to complement intellectual
exercises involved in solving the multiple progression of ideas in a




a. That a program in Organizational Development be
initiated at S&R prior to the educational program,
and be completed well in advance of it.
b. That a continuing consulting arrangement be set up
with a competent organizational specialist.
c. That organizational purpose be promulgated and
proselyted until accepted by the members of S&R.
d. That newly assigned officers be thoroughly oriented
to their work; that they be given in-depth interviews
prior to placement; that they be given one week prior
to placement to allow time to become acquainted with
all aspects of the Division's work; that their positions
be clarified; and that they be guided in this process by
a single officer sponsor.
e. That an atmosphere of creativity be engendered
through formal programs of social training.
f. That the formal organization be promulgated and
discussed in small group sessions.
g. That a selective process be established for the
assignment of individuals to studies and that proposed
project officers participate in this process.
h. That the communications process be stressed with
special emphasis on cross-communications.
i. That informal organization be recognized as a
healthy and natural phenomena that can aid the
work process
.
j. That a higher degree of status be granted project
o ffi c e r s
.
I
k. That more frequent interaction within the division
be supported; that steps be taken to include the
formation of study teams, composed of an inter-
branch membership.
1. That frequent small group briefings be established
within the division to enhance division cohesion.
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4. Graduate Education Recommendations
Much of the discussion covered earlier on selection of per-
sonnel and on the subject of graduate education is actually beyond the
realm of control of the managers of S&R. Yet, if a recognition and
demand for graduate-level skills does not start at S&R, where will it
start?
There are over 70 officer billets in the division, yet there are
but 4 billets requiring graduate school training. There are over 200
officer billets at the Development Center, yet, only 24 of these billets
require graduate training. Of all these billets, not a single one calls
for a general management education.
Postgraduate school education does not guarantee that outstand-
ing studies will be produced. It does mean, however, a higher probability
that they will be better than without such education. It might be noted that
the general management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School
covers all the disciplines in the previously recommended educational
solution. Moreover the operations research/systems analysis graduates
can offer a more intricate mathematical approach to these areas. They,
in conjunction with, graduates of the physical sciences can be beneficial
to the management of studies. Our final recommendation is therefore,
that an analysis be made of the requirements for graduate school educa-
tion at S&R, with special attention given to the general management
student.
D. A FINAL WORD
We have viewed the Studies and Requirements Division from a four
dimensional framework. In so doing, we have touched on several
109

intervening variables that seem to block the organization's effectiveness.
It seems apparent to us that these variables are no more or no less
numerous than in most other organizations. The main reason for this
may be that the S&R Division shares with most organizations the dif-
ficulty of addressing its own multi -dimensional nature.
What lies in the future for the Studies and Requirements Division
is the potential it has for breaking through the constraints of unintentional
neglect in the handling of some of its key variables. This is the syndrome
of one-dimensional logic caused by an accustomed way of thinking about
organizational problems.
It is possible that with this breakthrough the Studies and Require-
ments Division can become a model organization, emulated by the entire
Marine Corps. The division is in an enviable position. It is neither old
nor new, but stands on the threshhold of progress; ready to move forward








Personality and Organization, Harper h Row, 1957.
Argyris, C.
,
Integrating the Individual and the Organization, Wiley,
1964.
Barnard, C. I. , The Functions of the Executive, Harvard, 1938.




The Human Group, Harcourt Brace, 1950.
Likert, R.
,
New Patterns of Management, McGraw-Hill, 1961.
March, J. and Simon, H.
,
Organizations, Wiley, 1958.
Maslow, A., Motivation and Personality, Ha rppr &• Row, 1954.
Maslow, A.
,
Eupsychian Management, R. D. Irwin, 1965.
Mason, J.
,
How to Be a More Creative Executive, McGraw-Hill, I960.
McGregor, D.
,
The Human Side of the Enterprise, McGraw-Hill, I960.












"The Practice of Science and the Science of Practice",
in Bennis, ed.
,
and others, The Planning of Change, Holt, Rinehart,
1961.
Hand, H. and Slocum, J.
,
"Human Relations Training for Middle
Management: A Field Experiment", Academy of Management
Journal, pp. 403-410, December, 1970.
Ill

Homans, G. , "The Small Warship", American Sociological Review,
Vol. 11, pp. 295-302, 1946.
Randall, F.
,
"Stimulate Your Executives to Think Creativity",
Harvard Business Review, pp. 121-128, July-August 1955.
THESES
Murphy, D. , Management Control of R&D in the U. S. Marine Corps
,
M.B.A., Thesis, The George Washington University, 1968.
Snoddy, L.
,
A Survey of the Duties Assigned to Enlisted Marines




Budgeting for Research and Development in the United
States Marine Corps, M. B.A. Thesis, The George Washington
University, 1 96 9-
TECHNICAL REPORTS
U. S. Air Force Systems Command, Report (49 - 604) 63 - 1849.
Selecting Sources of Research and Development Competence,
by R. E. Andrea, 12 March 1963.
Office of Science, Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
Report 1354(08), The Adaption of Complex Organizations to
Changing Demands, by P. Selznick, M. Janowitz, W. Kornhauser,
J. March, 18 July 1962.
Department of the Army, Operations Research Office, The Group vs.
the Individual in Research, by H. Milton and H. Green, July I960.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
U. S. Department of the Navy, Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation Management Guide, Vol. I, Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1965.
U. S. Marine Corps, A Study of the Marine Corps R&D Program,





U. S. Marine Corps, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Manual, (NAVMC) 2635, dated 2 December 1970.
U. S. Marine Corps Order 3900. 3B dated 26 August 1969-
U. S. Marine Corps Order 3900. 4A dated 16 March 1971.
U. S. Marine Corps Order 3900.6 dated 14 November 1968.
U. S. Marine Corps Order 3900.7 dated 25 June 1969.
U. S. Marine Corps Order 3900.8 dated 7 November 1970.
U. S. Marine Corps Order 3920.3 dated 14 October 1967.
U. S. Marine Corps Development Center Order P5000. 1 dated
13 April 1971.
U. S. Marine Corps Development Center, Command Directory,
dated March 1971.
U. S. Marine Corps Development Center, Project Listing, dated
March 1971.
U. S. Marine Corps Development Center, Studies and Requirements
Division, Research, Development and Studies Handbook, dated
U. S. Army Management School, Army Management Views, Vol. XII,
U. S. Army Combat Developments Command, Combat Development





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Assoc. Professor M. J. Stecker, Code 55Zr 1




4. Captain William R. Smith, USMC 1
26080 Via Riviera
Carmel, California 93921
5. Colonel W. P. Mitchell, USMC 2
Chief, Studies &: Requirements Division
Marine Corps Development Center
Quantico, Virginia 22134
6. LtCol John Gould, USMC 1
Air Officer, Studies & Requirements Division
Marine Corps Development Center
Quantico, Virginia 22134
7. Operations Analysis and Administrative Sciences 1
Library
Naval Postgraduate School






DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA -R&D
iSecurity classification ot title, body ot abstract and indexing annotation rvu*t be entered when the overall report is classified)
Originating activity (Corporate author)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Za. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
2b. GROUP
3 REPOR T TITLE
An Investigation into the Functional Problems and Educational Requirements of a
Military Research and Development Organization: A Case Study of the Studies and
Requirements Division, Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico, Virginia
4 DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type ot report and. inclusive dates)
Master's Thesis; June 1971
5 Au THORISI (First name, middle initial, last name)
William Richard Smith
6 REPOR T D A TE
June 1971
7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
116
7b. NO. OF RE FS
39
Sa CONTRACT OR GRANT NO
b. PROJEC T NO
Sa. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
9b. OTHER REPORT NOI5I (Any other numbers that may be assigned
this report)
10 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.




A clinical investigation was conducted into the Studies and Requirements
Division, Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico, Virginia, to assess the
potential value of an educational program that had been proposed previously as a
solution to the problems of the Division. The analysis proceeded along four
dimensions: (1) a personal human dimension, (2) a formal organizational dimension
(3) a social system dimension and (4) a technological dimension.
A leading theorist's work was utilized in each analysis as a guide in identifying
the variables that functioned in the Division to prevent it from attaining a desired
degree of effectiveness. The proposed educational program was then related to the
problems found in order to assess its potential value.
It was found that the problems stem from the relations among elements of the
total situation. A balanced solution is proposed which incorporates the educational
program as a necessary sub-set of a larger correctional effort. The larger effort
recommended includes a form of organizational development program.
FORM
I NOV 65
S/N 0101 -807-681 1
1473 (PAGE 1) Unclassified





Marine Corps Development Center





















S"^ and EJ:,f^ re -
«. J
0r




c.l An investigation into
the functional problems
and educational require-
ments of a military re-
search and development
organization.
"iesS606
Anii
Instigation
